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ABSTRACT
This study concerns the state and violence in the Western Cape. This study was
undertaken because the Western Cape has since 1996 been plagued by violence,
including bombings, assassinations and violent protests. In particular these violent
incidents have been labeled as terrorism or urban terrorism. The South African
government does however not have a definition or a policy promulgated into law
regarding terrorism. Very little progress has been in apprehending the person(s) and
or group(s) responsible for these incidents of violence. The study therefore looked at
violence in the Western Cape in an exploratory way.
The aim of the paper was to (1) find credible appropriate definitions of terrorism, (2)
to identify possible role players in violence, (3) to establish a chronology of violent
events, (4) to identify the frequency, distribution and patterns of violence, (5) analyse
the communication of events. An underlying theme throughout the paper is the weak
state in which violence is a cause, consequence, and indicator of the weak state. The
violence-plagued Western Cape is the geographical focus of the study. The paper
looks at three incidents of violence, representative of the types of violence that have
taken place in the Western Cape. The bombing of the Planet Hollywood restaurant,
the killing of policeman Bennie Lategan and the killing of gangster Neville Herold are
the cases discussed by in paper. For the purpose of the paper, the period of interest is
the transitional period of the 1980's to 1994. The period under study is August 1998
to December 1999.
After careful consideration of all the information the following conclusions where
reached. The killing of Bennie Lategan is a terrorist act while the killing of Neville
Herold and the Planet Hollywood bomb blast are not terrorist acts according to the
definition used by this paper. PAGAD emerged as the major role player involved in
violence. The organization is also complex and multidimensional with various
groupings within the organization. The weak policing and justice systems are among
the factors contributing to violence.
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The propositions and theories suggested by this study are based on current
information and therefore speculative. Should more information become available
these propositions may need to be revisited. Continual research on this topic is
therefore important.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie gaan oor geweld in the Wes Kaap. Die studie was noding omdat die Wes
Kaap sedert 1996 geteister word deur geweld, insluitende bomplanting, sluipmoorde
en geweldading protesaksie. Hierdie geweldige insidente is bestempel as terrorisme
of stedelike geweld. Die Suid Afrikaanse regeering; het egter nie n'definisie of beleid
oor terrorisme nie. Baie min persone of groepe verantwoordelik vir geveld is
voorgekeer. Hierdie studie gaan dus oor geweld in die Wes Kaap.
Die doel van hierdie studie was (1) om 'n definisie van terrorisme, georganiseerde
misdaad, geweld, vigilantsme en Islamise Fundamentalisme te vind, (2) om moonlike
deelneemers van geweld te identifiseer, (3) om 'n kronologie van geweld op te stel.
(4) Sekere patrone van geweld te identifiseer, en om te studeer wat hierdie insedente
aan ander kommunikeer? 'n Onderligende tema, in die studie is die swak staat waarin
geweld n' oorsaak, gevolg en aanduiding is van die swak staat is. Die Wes-Kaap is
die geografiese focus van die studie. Die studie kyk na drie insidente van geweld wat
alle tipe geweld in die Wes Kaap verteenwoordig. Die bomontploffing van die Planet
Hollywood restaurant, die moord van polisieman Bennie Lategan en bende leier
Neville Herold is die gevalle wat bespreek word in die studie. Vir die doel van die
studie is die tydperk van die 1980' s tot 1994 van belang. Die tydperk onder
bestudering is Agustus 1998 to January 1999.
Na oorweging van al die informasie is die volgende gevolgtrekkings gemaak. Die
Planet Hollywood ontploffing en die moord op Neville Herold is nie terroriste dade
nie, maar die moord op Bennie Lategan is n' terroriste daad. PAGAD kom te
voorskyn as die grootse deelmeemer in geweld. Die organisasie is kompleks en het
vuulvuldige dimensies met verskeie groepe binne die organisasie. Swak polisieering
en die regsletsel is onder die faktore wat bydra tot geweld.
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Die voorstellings en teorië wat voorgestel in die studie, is gebaseer op huidige
informasie en daarom is dit spekulatief. Indien meer inligting beskikbaar gemaak
woord sal die afleidings en voorstelle hersien moet word. Voordurende navorsing oor
hierdie onderwerp is daarom nootsaaklik.
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Dedicated to all those affected by violence.
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CHAPTER ONE: RESEARCH DESIGN
EXTRACT
26 August 1998, a bomb explodes at the Planet Hollywood restaurant at the Victoria
and Alfred Waterfront in Cape Town. The explosion kills two people and injures 26
others. The damage to the restaurant is estimated at R3 million. I
On 14 November 1998 Neville Herold, alias Jacky Lonte of the Americans gang is
shot dead outside his home in Athlone.2
14 January 1999, policeman Bennie Lategan is shot dead while driving homefrom
work. Fifteen bullets hit the vehicle he was driving.3
Introduction
South Africa is one of the most violent societies in the world, with the roots of
violence and disorder firmly and deeply embedded in our social and political past.
Various forms of violence defile every aspect of our lives. This ranges from gang-
related violence, violence in the home, school, church and work as well as political
violence, which has been the dominant and most focussed on form of violence over
the past three decades, both within the country and abroad. While the focus was
largely on our countries political struggles, violence like child abuse, rape, gang
related disorder and domestic violence continued at high levels but received minimal
police and media attention. Because of this and our unique political history various
forms of violence have become dominant in certain communities.
1 The Human Rights Commission Report, August 1999, p.35.
2 The Weekly Mail and Guardian Newspaper, November 13-20 1998.
3 Aranes, J. and Schronen, J. "PAGAD raid follow killing", Cape Argus, 15 January 1999.
13
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The democratic election in 1994 ended the apartheid regime, a major source of
political violence. In its place a democratically elected Government of National Unity
(GNU) was instituted following the interim constitution of 1993 which was the
precursor for the final democratic constitution in 1996. South Africa's constitution is
hailed as one of the most democratic constitutions in the world, yet the decrease in
violence did not follow democracy as expected. Instead a new form of violence has
taken root in the country, labelled as "terrorism" or "urban terrorism" and has
emerged as the dominant type of violence in the Western Cape. It is this type of
violence this paper wants to explore and understand.
The events identified in the extract above are a few examples of the magnitude and
extent to which violence and conflict is a part of the Western Cape. It is these events
that members of the police corps, South African and foreign media as well as South
African and foreign politicians have randomly labelled as acts of terrorism or urban
terrorism. Not all acts of violence committed during the period under study can be
viewed as terrorist according to the definition used by the paper. Nevertheless, if one
applies the definition of terrorism as defined by Moss4 and its included variants the
majority of acts included in this study can be viewed as terrorist.
The paper however VIews all forms of violence as a form of communication.
Labelling violence acts should therefore only occur after we have established what
violent acts are trying to tell us and not before. The purpose of this paper will
therefore be to fully understand and explore in depth the nature of this violence.
Statistics compiled by the Western Cape police department and published in the
Sunday Argus was used for this purpose.
4 Quoted in Schmid, A. P. Political Terrorism: a research guide to concepts, theories, data bases,
and literature and a world directory of terrorist organisations by Jongman, A.J. Amsterdam:
C.O.M.J Publication, 1984, p.125.
14
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These statistics are grouped for the period between January 1998 and January 1999
and indicate in total 696 incidents of pipe-bomb, petrol-bomb and drive-by attacks in
the Western Cape. Of these, 188 incidents are related to People Against Gangsterism
and Drugs (PAGAD), who gained public notoriety when known gang leader Rashied
Staggie was burnt to death in 1996. To date, very few suspects have been arrested in
connection with these incidents. Gang related incidents account for 470 of the 696
incidents and 140 suspects have been arrested' It must be noted that these incidents
do not include the total numbers for January to December 1999 due to police
reluctance to discuss and disclose information of pending court cases. The author
therefore compiled incident figures discussed by the newspaper. In an effort to curtail
further violence, the police have instituted several anti-crime programs such as
Operation Recoil in October 1998 and Operation Good Hope in January 1999.
Through these programs, a number suspects have been arrested, and at the time of
writing a number of suspects were awaiting trail.
Profile of the Western Cape
The Western Cape is one of two provinces not under the control of the African
National Congress (ANC), with the provincial government headed by a coalition
between the New National Party and the Democratic Party. In 1995 the estimated
total population in the Western Cape stood at 3 721 200 of whom 2 124 800 are
Coloured, 675 500 are Black, 885 800 are White and 35 100 are Asians." Historically
the Western Cape was a Coloured labour preference area in which the movements of
Africans were restricted through Influx Control. Considerable polarisation of race,
religion, and language is evident in the province and was exacerbated by the Group
Areas Act.
5 Sunday Argus, 3/4 January 1999.
6 Demographic Statistics 1995, Central Statistical Services, Pretoria: 1995.
15
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Coloured residents are politically significant because they make up the majority of
residents in the Western Cape and wield considerable power in determining the
political party that governs the province. Coloured political sentiment is therefore
important for securing long-term democracy, although Coloured people make up only
nine percent of South Africa's total population in 1995.7
In the earlier part of the century, Coloured people had limited political rights. These
rights were denied them when the National Party came to power in 1948. Part of the
grand plan of apartheid was to forcibly remove non-whites from urban areas and
relocate them to undeveloped areas. During the 1950's under the Group Areas Act,
thousands of Coloured people were forcibly removed from the District Six areas in
Cape Town. Coloured people were resettled in the area called the Cape Flats. The
Cape Flats soon after its creation became synonymous with gangsterism and high
crime rates.f While the Western Cape has a history of violence confined mostly to
Coloured areas of the Cape Flats, the recent incidents of violence however indicates
that the violence has moved beyond the Cape Flats into the city and business areas.
Gangs and Organised Crime on the Cape Flats
Before the 1994 election, a number of gangs with alliances existed and frequently
fought about turf and prices for drugs. Drug trafficking was limited to mandrax and
dagga but the Americans gang ventured into the sale of cocaine, crack, and LSD.
However, in 1994 the Firm, a cartel of different gangs was formed in order to buy
drugs in bulk, distribute drugs, and arrange portions at agreed prices and allocates
distributing areas. This cartel however excluded the Sexy Boys, the Americans gang,
and the Chinese triads.
7 Demographic Statistics 1995, Central Statistical Services, Pretoria: 1995.
8 Pinnock, D. The Brotherhoods: Street Gang and State Control in Cape Town, Claremont: David
Phillip Publishers, 1984, pp.104 - 107.
16
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While turf battles between the Firm and gangs excluded from the cartel persisted,
gang related shootings and turf battles decreased significantly until 1996 when
PAGAD was formed. During the 1994 to 1996 period, the Firm also became involved
in a range of other illegal business activities such as prostitution, taxi operations, and
forged licenses."
The Political Problem
The political consequences of the tide of violence, conflict, and cnme m newly
democratised countries are enormous. Violence and crime are the major threats to
democratised countries and casts serious doubts on the quality and durability of the
democratic regime. Governments now view crime and violence as threats to national
security. National security is defined as "the ability to preserve the nation's physical
integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on
reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions
from outside; and to control its borders". 10
9 Scharf, W. and Vale, C. "The Firm - Organized Crime comes of Age During the Transition to
Democracy" in Social Dynamics, vol. 22, no. 2, December, 1996, pp. 6-10.
10 Hough, M. "Crime as a National Security Issue in South Africa," Strategic Review For Southern
Africa, vol. xvii, no. 2, November 1995, pp. 56-71.
17
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Traditionally, national security refers to external security and includes economic and
environmental security and recently domestic security has been added to the concept
of national security. The distinction between national security and domestic security
does however only apply to strong states but not weak states because domestic threats
bring into question the integrity of the government and the state. The South African
government in the White Paper on Intelligence published in 1995 identifies internal
and external challenges viewed as threats to national security. These are socio-
economic conditions such as massive socio-economic degradation, poverty, hunger,
homelessness as well as crime, violence, economic collapse, overpopulation, mass-
migration, ethnic rivalry, political oppression and terrorism.i' The South African
government's stance on security is framed by a number of considerations. Those
considerations are internal, international and regional conditions and have given rise
to the governments' particular stance on national security. Internal conditions based
on the legacy of Apartheid and the democratic transition, which has opened South
Africa to not only legitimate economic activities but also to transnational criminal
activities are at the core of the government's view on national security. On the
international front changes in the international community such as globalisation and
the end of the cold war has set the environment for South Africa's views on national
security, while on the regional front political instability and economic devastation are
other considerations. The government therefore viewed the Reconstruction and
Development Program (RDP) as the country's emerging national security doctrine.
The Reconstruction and Development Program's (RDP) aims are to meet the basic
needs of people, develop human resources, build the economy, and to democratise the
state and society were believed to be the core determinants for genuine peace and
lasting security.
11 White Paper on Intelligence, 1995.
18
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Large - scale violence, crime and conflict are evident in countries that have undergone
political transformations. South Africa is not alone in this regard. The former Soviet
Union experienced similar increases in violence and crime since the end of the
Communist regime in the late 1980'S.12 South Africa and the former Soviet Union are
however different. South Africa's transition was from an authoritarian regime to
democracy, while the Soviet Union's transition is from a Communist regime to a
capitalist system as well as to a democratic regime. South Africa's transition also
occurred in a relatively shorter period than that of the former Soviet Union, which is
undertaking the change to capitalism in a longer period.
Violence, conflict and crime produce problems for the consolidation of democracies
and are in particular a threat to the weak state, in which they are causes, consequences
and indicators of the weak state. The process of globalisation poses threats to weak
states because it results in the loss of control over the movement of people and goods.
States in transition are particularly vulnerable to the threat of transnational criminal
networks as found in the Western Cape.13 Violence, conflict and crime in the Western
Cape presents problems to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and
indicates the existence of the weak state.
Democracy also requires a culture that supports freedom of speech, media, assembly,
religion, rights of opposition, the rule of law and human rights according to Lipset."
Gibson and Gouws in their 1996 study found that support for the rule of law was
lowest amongst Coloured respondents. Coloured respondents have lower levels of
trust in the government institutions along with Indians and Whites. Coloured
respondents' support for legal institutions ofthe state decreased since a 1991 survey.
12 Ulrich, C. J. "The Criminal Threat in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Baltic Region," Conflict
Studies, vol. 275, October 1994, pp. 1-3.
Also see The Economist. "The high price of freeing markets," February 19-25 1994 pp. 29-30.
13 Williams, P. "Transnational Organized Crime and National and International Security: A Global
Assessment" in Society Under Siege: Crime Conflict and Illegal Weapons, Virginia Gamba (ed.)
Johannesburg, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 70-81.
14 Gibson, J.L. " The Paradoxes of Political Tolerance in the Process of Democratization," Politikon,
vol. 23, no. 2, December 1996, pp. 5-21.
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This indicates that the legitimacy of legal institutions is particularly low amongst
Coloured people. IS This could prove problematic for the consolidation of South
Africa's democracy.
Recent incidents of violence have no clear motive and the killing of gangsters and
police officers, the bombing of private property and police stations are wide ranging
and police assume that links exist between these incidents. Secondly, no group and or
person(s) have claimed responsibility for these attacks. This makes it difficult for the
state to employ appropriate public policy measures to curtail violence and conflict.
Part of the political problem is the absence of legislation that provides for a definition
of terrorism, procedures, which identify groups believed to be terrorist and action
necessary to prevent activities these groups are believed to commit.
The Research Problem and Research Questions
Conventional wisdom however holds that violence is a form of commurIÏcation.
Violence as a form of commurIÏcation tells us about the victim or target,
commurIÏcates with a broader audience, tells us about the perpetrator and their aims
and objectives. In is believed that the perpetrators of violent acts in the Western Cape
are communicating with various audiences. The messages sent are however unclear,
contradictory and need to be decoded. This paper attempts to decode these messages
through analysis.
15 Gibson, 1. and Gouws, A. "Support for the rule of law," Politikon, vo1.23, no.2, December 1996, pp.
5 -7.
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The paper is therefore concerned with violence in the Western Cape and in particular
the nature of acts labelled as "terrorism" or "urban terrorism" between August 1998
and December 1999. To understand the nature of violence a number of interrelated
issues are addressed, these include determining who the actors involved in violence
and conflict are, what or whom the targets of violence are and what the possible
contributing factors are which gives rise to violence in the Western Cape. Acts of
violence under discussion by the paper are viewed as forms of communication that
needs to be decoded and interpreted.
Methodology
The paper focuses on events randomly classified as acts of terrorism or urban
terrorism, which where perpetrated in the Western Cape between August 1998 and
December 1999. By focusing on these events the paper embarks on an exploratory
study of the nature of violence. Acts of violence cannot be examined individually
because too many violent events have occurred and inferences and assumptions made
about one incident may not necessarily hold true for another.
Data Collection and Analysis
The study makes use of qualitative research methods, usmg newspapers, legal
documents and other published material for analysis and information. Interviews
where conducted to supplement published material for an understanding of certain
events and processes.
The wealth of information obtained was analysed on the bases of logic, probability,
and authenticity and accuracy of the source and its ability to refute or support
propositions made by the study. Propositions made by this study are supported by
cases selected, published material, interviews and other documents. The chronology
of events in the seventeen months under study also supports propositions made in the
paper.
(1) The study therefore uses a coherent definition of terrorism whereby the actions
randomly labelled as terrorism or urban terrorism can be measured and redefined
where necessary.
21
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(2) The study identifies essential weaknesses indicative of the weak state using the
criteria set out by Joel S Migdal. Identify other weaknesses within the policing
and justice system as contributing factors in violence and conflict in the Western
Cape.
(3) The study identifies PAGAD as the direct actor involved in violence Western
Cape. Police, justice officials and politicians and intelligence agents are identified
as indirect actors.
(4) The study identifies the frequency, distribution, patterns of violence In the
between August 1998 and December 1999.
(5) Analyses what these violent actions may communicate and to who this
communication is aimed at.
Incidents of Violence
The acts included in this study and under examination were selected on the basis of
one or more of the following criteria. (1) Acts should be defined as "terrorist" by the
media and or politicians. The acts or events should be violent in nature, and should be
perpetrated in a public area and or against private property. (2) Acts should be
directed against the state, state organs and state employees. (3) From these events the
loss of life, injury, psychological damage and damage to property should have
occurred. Not all the above criteria apply to all the acts chosen for discussion. These
acts have diverse targets, settings, contexts and methods of execution.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted to supplement information. This was necessary because
written material did not have up to date information on certain issues.
22
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Limitations of the study
The number of events that can be addressed by the paper limits the study. The nature
of violence in the Western Cape places limitations on the type and quality of
information that can be obtained. It is difficult to research violence and crime due to
the illegal nature of such activities. Finally, the acts itself have limited the information
that could be gathered as no person or group has taken responsibility for the acts of
violence. It is impossible to clearly answer the research question posed by the paper
but the study does raise awareness of the issues involved.
Delimitation's of the study
The paper does not look at terrorism per se, but those specific incidents of violence in
the Western Cape that have been defined as terrorist.
Chapter Outline
Chapter Two:
The Difficulty of Definition: This chapter discusses and defines the concept of
terrorism. The chapter holds that the way in which terrorism is defined is problematic
and leads to the inability to understand and find solutions to the problem. Terrorism
can be defined as conflict between groups that have opposing ideologies. This
conflict manifests itself in bombings, kidnappings, hijackings etc. and breaks the rules
of conventional warfare.
Chapter Three
The Weak State: This chapter discusses the theoretical grounding of this paper,
Migdal's theory of state-society relations. This section uses Migdal's weak state
criteria to look at the South African State and society. The author views violence in
the Western Cape province as the cause for the weak state as well as a consequence of
the weak state. The justice and policing system are used as institutional examples of
the weak state. This chapter concludes that the weaknesses in the justice and police
systems are the causes and consequences of the weak state. The Departments of
Justice and the Department of Safety and Security have low rates of arrests and
conviction.
23
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Furthermore, the departments are plagued by labour actions such as strikes, work
stoppages and absenteeism that hamper investigations. Corruption and fraud are other
serious problems. The failure to transform the justice and policing system in terms of
race and gender representation in the Western Cape is yet another weakness. Other
state institution, that are weakening the state are the Intelligence Agencies, headed by
the Department of Intelligence created in 1999. The state has a hybrid of intelligence
services implicated in bombings in the Western Cape and other criminal activities and
are factors accounting for the weak state and inability to curtail violence. The conflict
between the national government and the provincial government with regards to
matters of justice and policing only add to the problem. It is believed that all these
weaknesses in the justice and policing system are responsible for the low rate of
arrests of people responsible for acts of violence in the Western Cape.
Chapter Four
The Three Faces of PAGAD: This chapter discusses the group People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs as direct participants in conflict and violence in the Western
Cape. The chapter also discusses the definition of organised crime, vigilantism and
Islamic fundamentalism. Vigilantism and organised crime have in common the use of
violence to achieve its aims. These definitions should be kept in mind when assessing
PAGAD. This chapter provides an overview of the group in terms of its mission
statement, organisational structure, links to other organisations and public opinion on
the group.
Finally it analyses and assesses the group according to its strategies, leaders and
motivation for engaging in a chosen cause of action. This chapter concludes that
PAGAD may not be thought of as one organisation, with one set of objectives and one
set of leaders, but as three separate yet interdependent organisations. Each of the
organisations has there own leader, objectives, and strategy to achieve their
objectives.
24
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Chapter Five
Chronology of events: This chapter provides a chronology of relevant violent events
that occurred from August 1998 to December 1999. The chronology includes local
and international viewed as related to each other.
Chapter Six:
The Analysis: This chapter is interested in the frequency, distribution and pattern of
violent acts during the seventeen months of August 1998 and December 1999.
Secondly, the aim is to classify violent acts according to the definition of terrorism
discussed in Chapter 2 and examine what violent acts are communicating to the
audiences.
Chapter Seven
Concluding Remarks: This chapter concludes the study of violence in the Western
Cape by looking at the major points asserted and developed by the paper. This chapter
also suggests policy measures that the state may employ to better deal with the
problem of violence as discussed in the paper.
25
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CHAPTER 2:THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINITION
Introduction
This chapter addresses the following questions. What is terrorism and how ought it to
be defined? This definition is designed especially to fit activities in the Western
Cape. The government of South Africa does not adopt this definition. This chapter
evaluates the definitions of terrorism by different scholars and assesses its strengths
and weaknesses as well as that used by the Western Cape police. Ill-defmed and
inappropriate use of the term terrorism and urban terrorism has consequences for the
solutions the state employs to deal with this problem. The chapter also looks at the
term Islamic Fundamentalism that is also increasingly used by the media to describe
actions and organisations. The final question asks what these definitions have in
common and whether these definitions are better understood as conflict.
Defining Terrorism
J.J Lader-Lederer defines terrorism as "policy by crime and is characterised by no
connection with legitimate warfare between two military establishments ...,,16
Connor Cruise 0' Brien sees terrorism as "unjust violence against the democratic
state that permits peaceful forms of opposition". 17
Benjamin Netanyahu defines terrorism as "the deliberate and systematic murder,
maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends".18
16 J.J Lader-Lederer, "Defining Terrorism: A comment," in Han, H. H. (ed.), Terrorism and Violence:
Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control, N.Y.: Oseana Publishers. Inc, 1993, p. 56.
17 Quoted in Terrorism, legitimacy, and Power, Crenshaw M (ed.), Middletown, Connecticut:
Weslyean University Press, 1984, pp.I-4.
18 Netanyahu, B. Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Great Britain: Redwood Burn Limited, 1986,
p.6.
26
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Morrison defines terrorism as "events involving relatively highly organised and
planned activity on the part of small, but cohesive groups in which the aim of the
activity is to damage, or eliminate government property or personnel. These activities
includes bomb plants, sabotage of electrical and transportation facilities,
assassinations (attempted and successful) and isolated guerrilla activities.l"
Neale defines terrorism as "symbolic acts entailing the use or threat of violence and
designed to influence political behaviour by producing a psychological reaction in the
recipient that is also known as terror. Terrorism is sometimes also known as terror.
Terrorism is sometimes known as "politics by violence" ...,,2o
Laqueur defines terrorism as "the use of covert violence by a group for political ends
is usually directed against government, less frequently against another group, class or
party. The ends may vary from the redress of specific grievances to the overthrow of
a government and the taking of power, or to the liberation of a country from foreign
rule. Terrorists seek to cause political, social, economic disruption and for this
purpose frequently participate in planned and incriminate murder.,,21
19 Ibid., p. 126.
20 Ibid., p. 127.
21 Ibid., p. 136.
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Moss defines terrorism as follows: "Terrorism might be defined as systematic use of
intimidation for political purposes. That formula is broad enough to cover all sort of
varying situations. Terrorists can be classified according to their beliefs, or their
targets, but it is probably more useful to single three tactical variants of terrorism.
Repressive terror is used by a government to keep its grip over the population or by
the rebel movement as a means of eliminating rivals, coercing popular support, or
maintaining conformity inside the organisation (in other words 'traitors' and silencing
critics). Defensive terror can be used by private groups like the American vigilantes
to keep order or uphold the status quo; by patriots against foreign invader; or by a
community defending its traditional rights. Offensive terror ... is used against a
regime or a political system.,,22
Problems with the Above Definitions of Terrorism
Scholars of terrorism define acts as terrorist by looking at the motivations for the
incidents. But motivations for violence, threats and intimidation are in most cases not
stated and are in some cases political and other cases not politically motivated. Most
definitions of terrorism and all of the above, define terrorism by looking at the type of
actions that are undertaken by groups and individuals as a means of classifying
terrorism. Secondly, terrorism is defined by the motivations of the perpetrator.
motivations. This is problematic because engaging in certain types of actions does
not make one a terrorist. Including, the possible motivations for acts by the
perpetrators is flawed, because very often groups and individuals do not state the
purpose for which an act was committed, therefore the motive is never clear.
Assumption about the perpetrators' aims may be biased or flawed. These definitions
describe what terrorists do and why, but not what terrorism is.
22 Ibid., p. 126
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Terrorism is in essence conflict, between groups and individuals with opposing
ideologies and views. These groups or individuals may have different views about the
conflict, each other and the environment in which the conflict takes place. Terrorism
can further more be defined as unilateral conflict because very often the groups and or
the individuals who are targets of violence are not directly involved in the conflict and
in some cases are not aware of the conflict. It is this element that gives this conflict
its unilateral nature. Those who feel that another group has wronged their group can
view terrorism as a form of protest.
Preferred Definition of Terrorism
A more insightful definition is that of J.J Lader- Lederer, who writes that terrorism is
not connected to conventional warfare. To expand, conventional warfare isdefined by
rules of war as defined by Clausewitz. According to Clausewitz war can only be
defined as such, when organised violence is waged by the state, for the state and
against the state. For Clausewitz war consists of three elements i.e. the people, the
army and the state. Governments wage war with the use of armies. Armies are
defined as organisations that serve their government and are made up of soldiers.
Armies have different customs and soldiers live separately from civilians. 23
The idea that people should not be involved in war came from Clausewitz classic
writings on the art of war. Von Kriege a compatriot of Clausewitz held that war is the
business of the state. This brought about the distinction between combatants, which
are trained soldiers and non-combatants, civilians. Laws govern the conduct of war
and prescribed the criteria for those who can take part in war. Laws also govern the
use of weapons, indicating those that can and cannot use weapons and how it should
be used. J.L lader-Lederer's definition of terrorism is based on Clausewitz rules of
war and the distinctions that this accompanies.
23 Van ereveld, M. The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 1-59.
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Martin van Creveld in his book The Transformation of War defines the breaking of
the rules of war as Low Intensity Conflict. According to Clausewitz if the state is not
involved in war then it cannot be called war. Low Intensity Conflict makes no
distinction between government, army and people. It does not involve regular armies
on either side but civilians made up of women, children old and young. These
"people's armies" in most cases do not use modem weapons such as aircraft's and
nuclear weapons.i" Terrorism is an example of Low Intensity Conflict.
Looking at the various authors' definitions of terrorism, the following may be said. It
comprises deliberate actions against groups, institutions and individuals involving
relatively organised and planned activity on the part of small but cohesive groups,
with the aim of inflicting fear, damage, and death on targets. These targets may be
government property and personnel and other citizens. Bombings, kidnappings,
hijackings, sabotage and massacres are used as means to achieve the perpetrator aims,
with the ultimate objective to overthrow government.
Terrorist Actions
A 'terrorist action' is defined as action carried out for political or social purposes,
including certain kinds of large-scale mercenary purposes. Terrorist actions are
normally criminal actions according to national and international law. It includes
successful or unsuccessful attempts on those perceived as innocent or guilty, it
includes action against targeted or untargeted victims; the taking of combatant or non-
combatant hostages torture of innocent or guilty people. Finally, it usually but not
necessarily has either the effect or the intention or both of causing terror and panic. 25
24 Ibid., pp. 1-59.
25 Gearty, C. Terrorism, Hamphire, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1996, p x vi.
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The Targets of Terrorism
The targets of acts labelled as terrorism are significant because these targets may be
material and or and human targets that tell us about the perpetrators. The targets may
be individuals, who have decision-making powers or citizens with no influence over
politics. While terrorist actions are also directed against audiences and can be
distinguished by the way, in which they view the terrorist message. The audience
may react in several ways to the terrorist message. Firstly, the terrorists may gain
sympathy and support from certain groups and secondly the audience may not be
aware of the message or the audience may react with hostility towards the terrorists.i''
Analysing the targets of terrorism is essential when analysing terrorist actions.
The Definition of Terrorism and Urban Terrorism as used by the Western Cape
Police
The South African government does not have any policy regarding terrorism since the
repeal of the Suppression of Communism Act (Act No. 44 of 1950) in 1991 by Act.
138 of 1991. The Suppression of Communism Act identified communist
organizations, prohibiting communist activity, and communist publications.t To date
South Africa does not have any such Acts which provides for a definition of terrorism,
the detection and prohibition of terrorist activities, as well as organizations defined as
terrorist organizations suited to the post apartheid era. In a telephone interview with
a senior police official in the Western Cape, the following definition of terrorism was
given. A vigilante group should be suspected of involvement.
26 Crenshaw, M. Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, (ed.). pp.4 and 277.
27 The Suppression of Communist Act (Act No. 44 of 1950).
31
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
It should be directed against the state or state officials, a latter conversation with the
official however revealed that this was not the official government and police
definition. Much confusion in police circles exist as to what urban terrorism is and
how it is defined, this is evident through my research and conversations with police
officials of both the provincial and national police department. The official police
definition of terrorism according to this official is found in an internal police
document, which is not a public document. The parliament of South Africa does not
have an anti-terrorist policy promulgated into law.
Summary
Terrorism may be better defined as conflict between groups and people with
ideologies, which manifests itself through bombings, kidnappings and hijackings.
Terrorism or urban terrorism as used by the Western Cape police does not conform to
the definition of terrorism as employed by this paper. The definition of terrorism used
by this paper is as follows: Terrorism is deliberate action against groups and
individuals involving relatively organised and planned activity on the part of small but
cohesive groups, with the aim of inflicting fear, damage, and death on targets. The
targets may be government property and personnel and other citizens. Bombings,
kidnapping, hijackings, sabotage and massacres are used as a means to achieve the
perpetrators aims, with the ultimate objective to overthrow the government.
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CHAPTER 3: THE WEAK STATE
Introduction
This chapter discuss the South African State by looking at the work of JS Migdal
(1988) in his book titled Strong Societies and Weak States: State - Society relations
and state capabilities in the Third World. Migdal makes the distinction between the
state and society and the roles they play vis-á-vis each other. He holds that certain
states can be described as strong states while others are weak states according to their
capabilities to affect change in society. This chapter looks at Migdal's classification
of states and societies.i" He suggests that certain indicators can be used to identify
state strength and weakness. The South African State is a weak state as most
indicators of the weak state can be identified in South Africa. The South African
State is a unitary state with federal features. It consists of a national government,
provincial legislatures and provincial government, each has it's own sphere of
competence.i" Although Migdal does not discuss the state in terms of its institutional
features, a discussion of the institutional features is relevant to South Africa. This
chapter also looks at the emergence of the weak state from the late 1970's to present.
South African society can however not be fully classified as a weak society, although
society in the Western Cape is dangerously close to being described as such. Finally,
the weak state is discussed with reference to the Department of Justice, Safety and
Security and Intelligence. These departments' failures are institutional indicators of
the weak state.
28 Migdal, J.S. Strong Societies and Weak State: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in
the Third World, Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, 1988.
29 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 96) Chapter 3.
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Defining the State
The state is generally defined as "the organised aggregate of relative permanent
institutions of governance.r'" The state is said to have the following characteristics.
(1) The state has defined territory, borders within which it has a claim to authority. (2)
The state has sovereignty; this is the right of the state power, only limited by its
capabilities. (3) The state is composed of a nationality comprising a civil society. (4)
The state is a participant in a global society. (5) The state is a set of institutions of
rule and has a government, with state agencies that deliver services. (6) The state is a
legal system; it has a criminal justice system and other systems of rule. (7) Citizens
and public officials using myth, theories and symbols hold the idea of the state."
There are several approaches used to understand and study the state. During the
1980's three main approaches developed. The Organic approach views the state as a
critical actor in the public arena, influencing society, and economic processes. This
approach sees the state as a unitary actor in governance and assumes that the state
fulfils certain functions. The Configural approach sees the state as the provider of a
framework for the interaction of groups and other political action, while the
Interactive approach holds that the survival strategies of certain groups may clash
with that of the state. This approach looks at the interaction between the state and
social groups but does not see the state as the actor with an exclusive role.32 Migdal's
approach falls within the interactive approach as he looks at the interaction between
state and society.
30 Chazan, N. Mortimer R and Rothchild, D. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa: (Second
Edition), Boulders, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 34.
31 Crawford, Y. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994, pp. 45-49.
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State building
The state developed due to its capabilities to impose social control. State capacity to
control populations to enforce law, extract taxes, and organise citizens for the purpose
of war could not be achieved by any other social organisation and for this purpose, the
state has to develop multipurpose organisations. The control the state exerts over
society through such specialised organisations is called infrastructural power. The
state uses its infrastructural power to direct and co-ordinate society.
According to Migdal, high capabilities are required by states to effect social control.
The following indicates successful social control: (1) Compliance by citizens to the
prescribed rules of the state and the survival strategies that it advocates. The state's
prescribed survival strategies bring out conflict between the state and society.
Conflict may be about property rights, assets, and other resources. For effective
social control the state needs to deliver on its survival strategies. This entails the
delivery of resources and services to its citizens. (2) State institutions and those run
by the state require participation by citizens. Participation brings about strong state
institutions and denotes voluntary participation adding to the legitimacy of the state.
(3) Legitimacy is the acceptance by citizens of the rules of the state and it's right to
direct social control. The acceptance of legitimacy further entails acceptance of state
symbols. Through symbols, the state reinforces its survival strategies. Legitimacy
indicates citizen approval of the state and its rules. The state gains domestic
hegemony when compliance with survival strategies is attained at the expense of
those offered by rival organisations. When compliance is not achieved, conflict may
occur between the survival strategies offered by the state and those of rival
institutions.V
32 Chazan, Mortimer, RavenhilI and Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, pp. 40 -
35
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Strong States
Strong states are those states with high capabilities and are successful in achieving
domestic hegemony i.e. compliance with these criteria. Strong states have unified
networks of social control. These are unified rules of conduct that regulates relations
between individuals and individuals and the state. A single judicial system serves to
enforce the survival strategies of the state.34
Weak States
The weak state has smaller capabilities of regulation, extraction, appropriation and
penetration. Weak states tend to fail in achieving domestic hegemony against social
organisations with their own survival strategies. These organisations are likely to gain
a competitive edge over the weak state. The weak state coexists alongside such rival
institutions and groups and individuals may come under their control. The state
although entitled to sovereignty does not have it and rules of the state are not
universally applied."
Strong Societies with Pyramidal Structure of Social Control
The structure of society many be a reason for states' inability to achieve domestic
hegemony. There are two types of strong societies those with high levels of social
control and those with web-like strands of social control. Strong societies with
pyramidal structures have high levels of social control, while strong societies with
web-like social structures may also have high levels of social control. Social
organisations of strong states may be described as pyramidal structures of social
control. Because social organisations in strong states have rules consistent with that
of the state social control is achieved in the strong state. Strong states have domestic
hegemony over strong societies, because the state occupies the top position in the
pyramid of state-society relationship. The state is able to gain the top position in the
pyramid because its survival strategies correspond with that of the society."
41.
33 Migdal, Strong Socities and Weak States, pp. 24-33.
34 Ibid., pp. 4 -5.
35 Ibid., pp.8 - 9.
36 Ibid., pp. 33-40.
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Strong Societies with Web like structures of Social Control
These strong societies have a range of social organisations that have inconsistent rules
and incompatible social structure. These societies are web-like. Web-like societies
have no single system of control but have a network of strands. Strong societies with
web-like structures of social control have rules, which are inconsistent with that of the
sate. Organisations of strong web-like societies may be in contest with state
organisations. Strong states achieve dominance over web like societies by breaking
the web like structure of society to assert itself over society. Weak states, which
coexist along such strong web-like societies, compete with social organisations
headed by strongmen. Strongmen reinforce the breakdown of social control and
control part of the state and using rules of their own. According to Migdal, this is the
Triangle of Accommodation. The triangle is made up of state officials, the
implementers of policy and strongmen. Each has a distinct power base but operates
with some restraint. Each participant profits from this relationship at the expense of
the state. The strongmen thus have social control, which is what the state tries to
limit.37
Weak Societies
Weak societies have low levels of social control. The organisations in weak society
lack the capability to offer viable survival strategies. Strong states are able to
dominate these weak societies, but weak states located within weak societies fail to
achieve social control resulting in a lack of control from any source/"
37 Ibid., pp.39 - 41.
38 Ibid., 34 - 36.
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Characteristics of Weak States
Characteristics of weak states are high cnme rates, civil disobedience, and the
existence of private armies and "no go" zones for state personnel as well as the
existence of rival organisations that are in competition with the state. Furthermore the
weak state experiences tax revolts, has an informal economy running parallel to that
under the supervision of the state, cross border crime networks and experience
corruption from citizens and officials of the state.39
The process of globalisation has resulted in the loss of state authority and the weak
state facilitates the work of transnational criminal organisations. The state in Italy in
the Nineteenth Century gave rise to the Mafia and the rise of the criminal
organisations in Columbia in the 1970's and 1980's. Several factors add to the
vulnerability of states to internal and externally organised criminal groups. The
collapse of state structures and the reestablishment of these structures contribute to
state vulnerability. Changes in state structure may be accompanied by changes in
economic policies, which may increase the growth of internal and external criminal
activity within the state and across state borders. Transitional states are unable to
impose the control over populations that the previous regime did. A reason for this is
that a transitional states the lack of legal and institutional frameworks with which to
regulate society. This allows criminal organisations to grow and in some cases,
allows criminal organisations to enter the legal business and economic sphere. The
legal institutions of the transitional state face legitimacy problems, because citizens
associate law enforcement institutions with the previous regime. Law enforcement
institutions also have internal problems such as a lack of training and corrupt officials.
The state's weakness to provide citizens with services is a major problem of which the
consequence is the growth of illegal activities. States in transition are highly
permeable and in the South African case air, sea and land infrastructure
accommodates illegal trade in drugs and other goods."
39 Ibid., 74.
40 Williams, "Transnational Organized Crime and National and International Security: A Global
Assessment," pp. 70 - 81.
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Analysing South Africa according to the Weak State Criteria
When the South African State is analysed according to the criteria set out by Migdal
South Africa can be classified as such. It contains most of the criteria indicative of
the weak state.
High Crime Rates
In terms of violent crime, South Africa's murder rate was reported at 52 per 100 000
people in 1998. The figure for attempted murder stood at 62,7 per 100 0000 people,
while for robbery with aggravating circumstances the figure stood at 188.3 per 100
000 people. Crime known as social fabric crime which include rape and assault are
also high and stand at 104.1 per 100 000 people for rape, 489 per 100 000 people for
serious assault and 424.7 per 100 000 people for common assault." The reported
crime rates for January to May 1999 in terms of a provincial breakdown sees the
Western Cape as the province with the highest rate for violent crimes.42
Protection Rackets
Several organised crime groups exist in the Western Cape, the most notable being The
Firm and the Hard Livings gangs. These gangs have links to other smaller gangs in
the Western Cape as well as links to Chinese triads and Italian Mafia.43
41 http://www.sap.org.za/8crimeinfo/bulletin/1999(l).htm. 14 August 1999.
42 http://www.sap.org.za/8crimeinfo/bulletin/1999(8).htm. 14 August 1999.
43 Scharf, W. and Vale, C. "The Firm-Organized Crime Comes of Age During the Transition to
Democracy," in Social Dynamics, vol. 22, no. 2, December, 996, pp. 6-10.
See also Smith, A. "Rise of boss of bosses, who runs drug empire with iron fist," Cape Argus 17
March 1999.
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Private Armies
During the 1980's, political movements to the left and right of the political spectrum
had their own-armed wings. In the early 1990's these were disbanded and
incorporated into the South African National Defence Force. The establishment of the
South African National Defence Force and the incorporation of APLA and Umkhonto
we Sizwe into a single defence force lead to the retrenchment of old guard military
generals and other officials. These officials used their training in the commercial
sphere with many now owning and managing private security firms. The South
African private security industry is worth R 8.8bn in 1998 and has steadily increased
since 1978. The industry employs 128 ODD-securityofficers and has at its disposal 80
000 vehicles and access to other equipment.l" The private security industry poses the
potential danger of becoming private armies for civilians.
Tax Revolts
The state is plagued by non-payment of services with local government unable to
provide the necessary services such as refuge collection in certain areas. Tax revolts
were used in the 1980's as a method of destroying Black Local Government
structures. This method of revolt against government did however not end when the
democratic government was elected in 1994. Non-payment of services has rendered
several local governments ineffective. In the early 1990's residents in the up-market
suburb of Sandton refused to pay for their services, claiming it was discrimination
against high-income earners.45
44Schënteich, M. Unshackling the Crime Fighters: Increasing Private Sector involvement in
South Africa's Criminal Justice System, Johannesburg: The South African Institute for Race
Relations, 1999, pp. 21 - 25.
45http:www.ib.co.za/sanfedlmedia/260298a.htrn. 9 October 1999.
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Informal Economies
Shebeens in the Black townships are an example of the informal economic activity
operating parallel to that regulated by the state. Illegal shebeens do not fall under the
regulation of government. It is reported that 250 000 unlicensed shebeens are
operating in South Africa.46 In the Cape Peninsula in one year alone shebeens make
R 64,5 million. 47. The government loses out on the payment of taxes by the informal
liquor traders and other dues usually paid by liquor traders.
Shebeens are also linked to crime and violence. It is reported that many shebeen
owners are involved in the drug trade as well as on-going taxi violence between rival
taxi associations in the Western Cape. In July 1997 police confiscated cocaine as well
as mandrax from a shebeen in Manenberg. The illegal activities of shebeens where
highlighted by PAGAD through it's marches to shebeens suspected of involvement
with the drug trade. On the Cape Flats, gangs often operate shebeens.
Corruption by State Officials
Corruption by state officials is a worldwide phenomenon. In South Africa, the
government has instituted the Heath Commission to investigate corruption and
maladministration by state officials and private business. It is reported that R 23
million worth of cheques has been stolen from the offices of the Department of
Justice. Internal audits are not performed and unauthorised journal entries have been
made to journals of the department. Numerous courts countrywide face this problem.
It was also found that high-ranking officials claim false travel expenses from the
state.48
46http:embendi.co.zaJwerkmansnews.htm, 9 October 1999.
47http:acrchve.10/co/zaJArchives/1998/9808113/btov.html, 9 October 1999.
48Cameron, J. "Stolen cheques, false overtime claims, lost dockets bedevil justice department," Sunday
Argus, 3/4 July 1999.
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The Heath Commission also investigated persons that are suspected of defrauding the
road accident fund by making false claims against the road accident fund. Allegations
of nepotism against the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) have also been
made. In particular concerns have been raised about the method in which
employment contracts where awarded to employment agencies. It is alleged that the
sister of the human resource manager of the IEC was awarded employment contracts
while other more suitable companies tendered for these positions. 49
Cabinet Reshuffling
A further possible indicator of the weak state is the reshuffling of the parliamentary
cabinet. Reshuffling take place to prevent strong agencies and the development of
power bases within the state, Migdal calls this the Big Shuffle. This reshuffling of
cabinet is usually initiated the head of state, who appointment new people to head
certain state agencies. The head of state may appoint agency heads based on their
loyalty to him or her so as to undercut the creation and existence of power centres
within the state. The reshuffling of cabinet is a strategy employed to counter the
further weakening of the state. 50 The general election in June brought about a new
government and president. The cabinet was also reshuffled with some ministers
retaining their portfolios while others were placed in other portfolios or removed all
together. A Department of Intelligence under the leadership of Joe Nhlanhla was also
created.
49 The Mail and Guardian, February 5 - 11, 1999.
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These ousted were Pallo Jordan from Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Derek
Hannekom from Agricultural and Land Affairs. Cabinet positions that were
reshuffled were as follows with the Minister of Justice, Dullar Omar moved to the
transport portfolio, Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufumadi was moved
from this portfolio. Kader Asmal, was moved from Water Affairs and Forestry to
Education, Penuel Maduna from Minerals and Energy to Justice, Vali Moosa from
Local Government and Constitutional Affairs to Environmental Affairs and tourism,
Geraldine Fraser Moleketi from Welfare to Public Services and Nkosazama Zuma
from Health to Foreign Affairs. It is important to ask if Thabo Mbeki's reshuffling of
cabinet indicates the existence of power bases within the state and, if so what a kind
of power base does it indicate? This question is beyond the scope of this dissertation
and will therefore not be answered.
The Weakening of the South African State
South Africa's weak state developed in the 1980's. The state was weakened by the
government with its "total onslaught" doctrine and corresponding "total strategy" to
counter the liberation organisations "people's war" doctrine and corresponding
strategy of "ungovernability". The period was characterised by low intensity conflict,
which is the breakdown of the rules of Trinitarian warfare. The state's total onslaught
doctrine gave the state military characteristics as the total strategy entailed the use of
bureaucratic and military institutions.
50 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: state-society relations and state capabilities in the
third world, 1996, pp. 214 - 222 & 226 - 229.
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The 1980's were a period of great conflict. Conflict occurred between and within
different groups. There was conflict between the state and the liberation organisation,
between and within liberation organisation and between liberation organisations and
society as well as and conflict within society. The conflict was essentially about
hegemony. Each party in conflict used different segments of society, each of which
had its own support structures and organisations. A multitude of organisations
emerged in the contest for hegemony; some of the organisations wanted power others
wanted some amount of power.i'
The state structure was reorganised, centralising power in the hands of the executive
and downgrading parliament and cabinet in an attempt to implement the Total
Strategy. State decision-making was increasingly militarised.Y Bureaucratic and
technological infrastructure was created to avert the perceived communist threat from
inside and outside South Africa. 53
The de facto merger of the three organs of the state president, the security
bureaucracy, as well as the technological and financial bureaucracy weakened the
state considerably. 54
51 Du Toit, P. State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A comparative study of
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1995, pp. 348-378.
52 Murray M, South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny: Popular Upsurge of Popular Protest,
Norfolk: The Tredford Press, 1995, p.35.
53 Bekker, S. "Engaging the State: dealingwith civil service culture," Indicator South Africa, vol. 7,
no.l, Summer, 1989, pp. 23 -26.
54 Ibid
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Special riot control functions were assigned to the police and in the 1980's these
functions were expanded under the National Security Management System, leading to
the police and military character of the state. Public disorder was so widely defined
that it included any social and political action the state viewed as illegitimate. The
police therefore became increasingly involved in the policing of social and political
activities. 55
The liberation organisation ANC/SACP and later the UDF through it's "people's war
doctrine" formed it's strategy of "ungovernability". The UDF formed in 1983 was
particularly active in the Western Cape. The UDF consisted of more than 500 civic,
youth, women's, and religious organisations. According to Mckinkley the UDF and
the ANC did not have much control over its strategy of "ungovernability" and this
resulted in the spontaneous expression resistance took. 56
The UDF focused their campaign on rent and service boycotts in black townships.
The rent and service boycott aims were to make Black Local governments
ungovernable. Alternative structures and organisations were created to deal with the
failure of the Black Local Governments, these included street committees and other
organisations.
55 Guelke A, "South Africa," in Brewer J.D, Guelke A, Hume I, Moxon-Brown and Wilson R, Police,
Public Order and the State, London: Macmillan Press, 1988, p.178.
56 Mckinley, D.T. The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography, London
and Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997, p. 34.
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The conflict between the government and liberation movements provided cover for
community conflict, with the proliferation of more gangs on the Cape Flats. In 1980,
280 groups identified themselves as gangs and spanned 30 areas in Cape Town.57 The
low intensity conflict between the government and the anti apartheid activists
provided cover for the proliferation of gangs on the Cape Flats. While organisations
and the government were engaged in their low intensity conflict the relationship
between the state and communities on the Cape Flats had deteriorated, with gangs
entrenched in society. A certain amount of co-operation between gangs and police
existed however, with gangs providing information to police on smaller gangs leaving
bigger and well-organised gangs untouched. 58
During the transformation period from 1990 to 1994 the state's structure stayed the
same, while certain apartheid policies were repealed. The state continued it's use of
police and military to curtail violence and in 1991 a special investigative unit was
established. The Special Investigative Unit according to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report was responsible for many human rights abuses. 59
The state was weakened from within from and outside the state. State officials who
engaged in corruption and dirty tricks weakened the state. The dirty tricks included
the killing of political opponents and others that opposed the state. The state was also
weakened by its unresponsiveness to the needs of citizens. 60
It did not provide the necessary services to its citizens and rival organisations offering
these emerged and were strengthened consequently. Gangs instead of the state
provided services to the community resulting in the loss of state authority. The state
was also not present in most communities through the provision of services such as
policing with the result that citizens therefore created their own organisations.
57Pinnock, The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town, pp.2-17.
58Ibid.,pp. 104-107.
59Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vo1.2,Cape Town: Juta 1998,
Chapter 1.pp. 1- 17.
60 Du Toit, State-Building and democracy in Southern Africa, pp.343-396.
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From the outside, the state was weakened through organised civil disobedience.
These included the failure to observe apartheid laws and regulations. Private armies
of the different political groupings also served to weaken the state."
Instead of following the state's prescribed justice system citizens formed their own
"people's courts" to deal with crime and other related issues faced by the
community.Y This is not surprising as law played an important part in the Apartheid
State. Racial discrimination was instituted through the legal system. Legality was
used as a substitute for legitimacy by the state. The National Party government ruled
through legality and created the impression of a free and accessible legal system. This
is the backdrop to the present weakness and problems experienced with justice and
policing in South Africa.
The 1993 constitution provided for the maintenance of the civil service as well as the
institutional arrangements of the state. This provided continuity to the state
institutions and eased the transition to the new government. But this also contributed
to the current state weakness in which the new government inherited problems of the
old civil service. In particular, the transitional arrangements for public administration
prescribed that those employed before the commencement of the 1993 constitution
shall continue to be employed by the state.
Transitional arrangements for the judiciary prescribed that those employed before
implementation of the 1993 constitution retain their positions. Similarly, courts
established prior to 1993 retained their authority. These procedural arrangements
have contributed to the present weaknesses found in the Departments of Safety and
Security and Justice. These departments are examples of state agencies characteristic
of the weak state.63
61 Ibid., pp.343-396.
62Nina, D. "Popular Justice or Vigilantism: PAGAD, the State and the Community," Crime and
Conflict, no.7, Spring 1996, p. 3.
63 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993.
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The Departments of Justice, of Safety and Security and of Intelligence
Background
The South African constitution is the supreme law of South Africa according to the
constitution of South Africa, Act (108 of 1996), and judicial authority is vested in the
court system. The National government is responsible for the administration of
justice and the Department of Justice is responsible for the court system, together with
judges, magistrates, and Attorney Generals. The Department of Justice has in the last
four years produced groundbreaking legislation, but it has however failed in it's
implementation of such acts as the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill, which allows
for the seizure of assets obtained through criminal means.f" In 1996, the Department
of Safety and Security adopted the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS),
which is an interdepartmental strategy to address crime and factors related to crime.
This strategy has produced dismal results. Notable failures in both these departments
are in the lack of prosecution for cases involving, PAGAD, gangsters, bombings,
drive-by shootings and the murders of police officers in the Western Cape. Only 10
cases involving the above were under prosecution in May 1999, while the status of 75
other cases were still to be assessed by the regional head of the Department of
Justice.65
Lack of proper communication between the intelligence agencies, police and justice
officials have been cited for lack of progress in these cases. Allegations have
however surfaced claiming police involvement in violent attacks in the Western Cape.
The Independent Complaints Directorate, established in 1997 is at present
investigating police involvement in these attacks.
48
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Departments of Justice and of Safety and Security rely heavily on information
obtained from the Department of National Intelligence and its intelligence agencies.
The intelligence structures have however been at the centre of much of the confusion
surround the spite of bombings in the latter part of 1999 with several unsubstantiated
allegations made that intelligence agents themselves are involved in bombings in the
Western Cape and other criminal activities.
National Intelligence Agencies including the National Intelligence Agency and the
South African Secret Service were created under the Intelligence Services Act, 1994
(No. 38 of 1994). The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is responsible for
domestic intelligence matters, while the Secret Service is responsible for International
Intelligence issues. The Intelligence Services Act regulates the creation, organisation,
and control of the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service
(SASS) and other such matters." The Act does not however provide indemnity
against prosecution and or conviction for any offence committed by its members. It
gives the Director General the task of overseeing data collection and overseeing the
responsible use of information to prevent the Agency and or members from using
information to further partisan interests. The National Strategic Intelligence Act,
1994 (No. 39 of 1994) defines the functions of members of the National Intelligence
Structures, establishes a National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and defines
the committee's functions. In addition the Act provides for the appointment of a Co-
ordinator for Intelligence as chairperson of National Intelligence Co-ordinating
Committee and defines his or her functions.f
64 The Prevention of Organised Crime Bill (B 118-98).
65 Rippenaar, L. "Terrorism cases move to top of roll," Cape Argus, 7 May 1999.
66 The Intelligence Serves Act, 1994 (No. 38 of 1994).
67 The National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (No. 39 of 1994).
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The Act indicates the following intelligence structures. The National Intelligence Co-
ordinating Committee (NICOC), the National Intelligence of the National Defence
Force, The National Investigation Services of the South African Police Services, the
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Secret Service. The different intelligence
structures each have their own functions to fulfil within their specified spheres of
operation. All intelligence structures report and provide intelligence to NICOC. The
National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee comprises of the Co-ordinator for
Intelligence, the Director-General of the Agency and the heads of the Intelligence
division of the National Defence Force; National Investigation Service of the South
African Police Service, the Director-General of the Service and other members as
established by NICOC.
NICOC is tasked with co-ordinating the intelligence supplied by the members of the
National Intelligence Structures, interprets national strategic intelligence for use by
the State and the Cabinet advises cabinet on intelligence matters and formulates
intelligence policy. Although legislation provides adequate regulation of intelligence
structures, uncoordinated and ineffective intelligence gathering had occurred in
respect ofPAGAD.
National and Provincial Governments
Since the formation of PAGAD in 1996, both the provincial and national government
have failed to take a clear and decisive stand concerning the organisation and
contradictory methods of policing have been used to deal with the group. Political
ineptitude may account for this. Although police have long suspected the
involvement of PAGAD in violence and crime, hardly any arrests and prosecutions
were instituted. An imperative question to ask is whether the reshuffling of cabinet
ministers especially of the departments of Justice and Safety and Security has
contributed to the arrests and prosecutions of PAGAD members. And whether the
newly created Department of Intelligence has contributed to the confusion and
renewed violence in the latter part of 1999.
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The Departments of Safety and Security and of Justice:
Low Rates of Arrest and Conviction
The police caught only 23 percent of offenders in 1997 and the criminal justice
system only sentences between 5-8 percent offenders. Between 1991 and 1996 the
total number of prosecutions and convictions fell by 40 percent. The conviction rate
for serious crimes such as murder stood at 31 percent in 1997, 18 percent for car
jacking, and 16 percent for rape. Between January and June 1997 prosecutors took on
180 000 cases, only 153 700 were finalised. Although the number of reported crimes
increased from 2 385 195 in 1994 to 2 733 363 in 1997 the number of convictions
declined.68
Lack of Transformation
The lack of transformation of the police services is another failure of the Department
of Safety and Security. There is a lack of transformation in terms of race and gender
representation in the police service structure itself as well as geographic
representation of the police services. The intake for white police officers has
increased from 70 to 74 percent in 1997. Two hundred and thrifty three of the 300
directors are white and 225 are male. Of the 956 senior superintendents, 712 are
white and 80 are female. There are 2656 superintendents of which 2041 are white and
309 are female. All five divisional commissioners are white males, while 7 provincial
commissioners are white and 48 of the 67 assistant commissioners are white.69
Allegations of racism abound in the police service, with black officers claiming that
they are passed over for promotion. The failure to deracialise policing in the Western
Cape are major failures of the national policing service as they should be steering the
transformation process. There are on average one police officer for every 346
civilians according to the Minister for Safety and Security in May 1998. In the
Western Cape, there is one police officer for every 328 civilians.Ï" The geographic
location of police stations and the distribution of resources are however in favour of
white communities in the Western Cape.
68 Schënteich, Unshackling the Crime Fighters: Increasing Private Sector involvement in South
Africa, p. 16& 3.
69 Human Rights Commission Report, July 1998,pAl.
70Human Rights Commission Report, May 1998, p.30-34.
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Lack of Training and Skills
South Africa's inadequate police services are the reason for the low rate of
convictions.Ï' One third of the people in the police force have a standard eight or
lower qualification, while only 8.68 have a post matric qualification.Ï'' The lack of
adequate training is evident in the number of avoidable shootings the police are
involved in. In Gauteng 110people, of who most are black were shot dead by police
in 1997. Only 37 of those shot proved to be a threat to the police.f The apartheid
police mentality still prevails in the police services and skills in crime prevention are
needed.
Labour Action
Between August 1996 and 1997, employees of the Department of Justice embarked on
21 strikes, 62 work stoppages in the South African Police Services in 1996 and 1997.
Absenteeism in the Cape Peninsula crime prevention unit was highest between
January and July 1998.
Corruption
The Heath Commission, which investigates maladministration and fraud in public
institutions stated in its first report that it has investigated irregularities in the payment
of an Umtata attorney by the Justice Department. The attorney was paid more than
R13 million for services rendered on instruction by the state attorney. In another
incident warrant vouchers were stolen from the Ekangola magistrates office in
Mpumalanga in 1997. The stolen vouchers resulted in the loss of R 43 million. The
Heath Commission has itself run into problems with the Department of Justice. The
Department of Justice is slow in the issuing of proclamations to institute
investigations into alleged malpractice.
71Schënteich, Unshackling the Crime Fighters: increasing private sector involvement in South
Africa's criminal justice system, p.3.
72 Human Rights Commission Report, June 1998, p.36.
73Human Rights Commission Report, July 1998, p.4l.
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The work of the commission can therefore not be carried out in ful1.74 Apart from
corruption, 1500 police officers have been convicted of criminal offences in 17
months to November 1998. From January 1998 to June 1998, more than 50 police
officers were convicted of murder, 20 of neglect of firearms, 82 for reckless driving,
and 16 for corruption.f Several police dockets have gone missing at the Mitchells
Plain police station on the Cape Flats, while seven cases against gang leader Rashied
Staggie have not lead to prosecutions."
The Department of Intelligence and Intelligence Agencies and Services
By law, the director of public prosecutions of the province concerned must give
permission for an undercover operation to commence. However, this does not seem
the case in practice with the NIA agents uncertain about the activities their informants
are involved in. "The intelligence agencies in South Africa are not communicating
with each other. The one does not know what the other is doing." Ettienne Hennop
researcher at the Institute of Security Studies told the Mail and Guardian newspaper."
An intelligence informer Martin Manuel also known as Mansoor is implicated in
several attacks in the Western Cape. Manuel is a former SADF explosives expert and
was involved with PAGAD for two years before his arrest in April 1999. Ayob
Mungalee arrested in February 1999 was also an NIA informer and was arrested with
four other PAGAD members in the Klein Karoo concerning illegal weapons and
detonators.Ï'' Mungalee claims that two Western Cape police officials transported
explosives and ammunition to the Cape and that police supply gangs with police
issued guns and ammunition" The St. Elmo's bomb blast in November 1999 is the
most baffling of incidents involving the NIA and police intelligence agents and
informers.
74 http://www.polity.org.zalgovedocs/commissionI1998Iheath.htrnll999.14 August 1999.
75 See Human Rights Report, November 1998, p.33.
76 http://www.polity.orglgovdocs/misc/llcp.html. 4 August 1999.
77 http://www.mg.co.za/mglnews/99aug2/24 aug-guns-pagad.htrnl., 28 March 2000.
78 http://www.mg.co.za/mglnews/99augll15aug-pagad.html.. 9 October 1999.
79 http://www.mg.co.zalmglnews/99aug2/24 aug-guns-pagad.html., 28 March 2000.
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The Conflict between the Western Cape Provincial and National Government
Chapter three of the Constitution provides a framework for co-operative governance
between the different spheres of government. Each sphere is said to be distinctive,
interdependent, and interrelated and must fulfil their functions within the
constitutional framework. Chapter Six of the constitution sets out the functions of
provincial government, Schedule 4 and 5 set out the concurrent functions of the
national and provincial governments and the exclusive functions of the provincial
government. Schedule 4 acknowledges that policing is a concurrent function of both
the national and the provincial governments of national governments.i" In the area of
policing that both spheres of government have failed.
The ANC sees the skewered distribution of resources between White and African and
coloured areas, as factors contributing to violence in the Western Cape. Police
stations, vehicles, and personnel are not distributed evenly in the province. The
provincial minister of Community Safety views violence and crime as a product of the
justice system and calls for the return of the death penalty and greater powers to the
provinces in terms of policing" National governments failure to intervene sooner
may compromise the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
80 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 96) Chapter 6, Schedule 5
and 6.
81 Sunday Argus, 8/9 August 1998.
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Summary
The provincial government instituted several policing programs such as Operation
Saladin and Operation Recoil but these did not decrease crime and conflict in the
Western Cape. Political ineptitude forms part of the reasons for the provincial
government's inability to solve crime and conflict on the Cape Flats. The provincial
government should have taken the problem more seriously, while the national
government should have intervened sooner and only launched Operation Good Hope
in early 1999 and created The Scorpions a special investigation team earlier this year.
Violence and crime in the Western Cape has unfavourable consequences to tourism,
which contributes 4.6 percent to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).82
This should have promoted national government to action sooner as a threat to South
Africa's foreign income, may be seen as a threat to national security. The national
government's late intervention can be attributed to the lack of an official definition
and stance on terrorism. Both the African National Congress and the National Party
used the crime and conflict situation in the Western Cape to score political points with
voters, in particular Coloured voters in the province.
82 South Africa Yearbook 1998 p.147.
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CHAPTER 4:THE THREE FACES OF PAGAD
Introduction
"The formation of the group People Against Gangsters and Drugs (PAGAD) in 1996
has lead to increases in the levels of violence in the Western Cape" according to a
senior police official. 83 A new type of violence commonly referred to as "terrorism"
and "urban terrorism" emerged in the Western Cape. Police have long suspected that
PAGAD is behind the bombings and murders of gangsters and police officers in the
Western Cape but was unable to gather proof of this. In December 1998, a PAGAD
member was arrested for the murder of gang leader Ismail April and more recently,
police arrested two members of PAGAD in connection with the murder policeman
Bennie Lategan and Rasied Staggie." There are persistent allegations that PAGAD85
were directly involved in violence and conflict referred to as "terrorism" and "urban
terrorism". It is therefore imperative to analyse the organisation and establish an
organisational structure and pattern of behaviour.
Some analysts describe the group as a vigilante organisation, pushed to take the law
into their own hands by a weak state unable to deal with crime. Some view PAGAD
as distinctly political and a threat to the state. While others describe the organisation
as a terrorist organisation with the United States Government including PAGAD as a
group to watch out for in it's report on terrorism. Others view PAGAD as an
organised crime group.86 Those who have attempted to understand and analyse the
group have offered narrow descriptions with very little analysis of the group. This
chapter offers an integrated view of the group through description and analysis.
83 Interview with senior police official on 2 September 1999.
84 Staff Reporter, "PAGAD member arrested over Lategan killing," Cape Argus, 28 June 1999.
Also see "PAGAD links to bombs as Imam face court," Cape Argus, 28 June 1999.
8S PAGAD refers to all three structures or organizations collectively.
86 Shaw, M. "Buying Time? Vigilante action, crime control and state responses," in Crime and
Conflict, no. 7, Spring, 1996, pp. 5 - 8.
See also Nina, "Popular Justice or Vigilantism? Pagad the State and the Community" pp. 1-4.
56
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
There is considerably difficulty in describing and classifying PAGAD. Its members
have engaged in a wide range of actions and activities, which can at best be described
as contradictory.V This is glossed over by most people who discuss the group. To
understand PAGAD it is imperative to acknowledge these contradictions and to
analyse them. The analysis of PAGAD's contradictions reveals three distinct
structures, which can be described as organisations, which make up PAGAD. One
conforms to a vigilante group, while the others are similar to organised crime groups
and an Islamic fundamentalist organisation. These organisations where classified by
assessing the actions that the group's leaders and members engage in against the
definitions of vigilantism, organised crime and Islamic Fundamentalism that follows
below.
Vigilantism and Vigilante Movements
Vigilantism according to Richard Maxwell Brown refers to "organised, extralegal
movement, the members of which take the law into their own hands.,,88 Within the
Brazilian context different types of actions are considered to be vigilante. One such
action is lynching, in which citizen's act against other citizens who have presumably
committed crimes. Other actions are the murder of presumed criminals by off duty
police and military officers for pay. These off duty police and military officers are
called "justice makers". Finally, there are death squads, which are organisations that
kill people, often with state involvement.
See also http://www.state.f.!.ov/www/globallterrorismI1998Report'aapb.html, 31 August 1999.
87 PAGAD has staged protest against drugs and gangsterism, South Africa's bid for the Olympic
Games in 2004, the Oudekraal development in Camps Bay and a state visit by British Prime Minister,
Tony Blair.
88 Huggins, M. K. (ed.) Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America. Essays on Extra
Legal Violence, New York: Prager, 1991, pp.7-9.
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According to Johnson quoted in (Nina 1996) six elements need to exist in order to
classify actions as vigilante. (1) Actions should be planned pre meditated and
organised. (2) Private citizens should act voluntarily in their conduct. (3) The actions
of citizens should be autonomous from government agencies. (4) Vigilantes should
reject crime. (5) A claim of personal and collective security should be made.89 (6)
Threaten to use force, or use force. This definition is used to classify vigilante actions
and groups.
Organised Crime and Organised Crime Groups
While the South African Police define organised cnme as the "systemic
commissioning of crimes motivated by a craving for profit and power.,,90 To be
defined as a criminal organisation within the above definition the first four of the
following criteria must apply:
>- A criminal group has to involve the collaboration of more than two people.
>- The group should be suspected of involvement in serious criminal offences.
>- The group should be involved in such criminal offences for a prolonged or
indefinite period.
>- The group should be motivated by the pursuit of profit and / or power.
According to the South African, police the above are the important indicators used as
defining criteria in the definition of a criminal organisation. Two others of the
following also need to apply before a group can be called a criminal organisation.
>- The organised crime group should simulate and or employ commercial and
business structures.
>- Group members should each have their own tasks to perform.
>- The group should have some form of discipline imposed on members of the
group.
89 Nina "Popular Justice or Vigilantism? PAGAD, the State and the Community," pp. 1-4.
90 Policing Priorities and Objectives for 1999 and 2000 of the Department of Safety and Security.
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~ The group should among other activities, engage in money laundering.
~ The group should use violence and other actions as means of intimidation.
~ The group should attempt to influence politics, the media, public administration,
judicial authorities or the economy.
~ The group should abuse provincial, national and international borders through the
executions of their activities.91
Organised crime groups however have different objectives and these objectives are
attained through a number of methods, which have different manifestations. If the
objective is political, the aim is either the overthrow of the political order or illegal
use of political processes. If the objective is economic, the aim will be met through
common crime, through illegal business and through legal business.Ï''
There seems to be no difference between vigilantism and organised cnme and
vigilante groups and criminal organisations. Both groups are organised, engage in
actions contrary to the law, and use violence to intimidate people, attempt to influence
politics, public administration, and the judicial authorities. The only difference
between organised crime and vigilante organisations is in relation to the motivation of
profit. Organised crime groups seek profit while it is said that vigilante organisations
do not.
Islamic Fundamentalism
The term Islamic Fundamentalism is increasingly used by governments, the media
and popular fictional work to describe actions by Islamic groups seeking the
reintroduction and extension ofIslamic law, often depicted as violent and forceful.
91 Policing Priorities and Objectives for 1999 and 2 000 of the Department of Safety and Security.
92 Malts, M.D. "On defming organised crime: The development of a defmition and typology," in
Organized Crime, (ed.), Nikos Passas, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995, pp.15 - 23.
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The academic approach to Islamic Fundamentalism from the work of Johannes J.G
Jansen in his book The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism described it as both
political and religious." He states that Islamic Fundamentalism fuses politics,
religion and violence. Violence is an important element in fundamentalism, as
politics cannot exist without violence. The dual nature of fundamentalism is reflected
in its demands for an Islamic state, which is political, and it's demand for an Islamic
society, which is religious. Jansen identifies certain characteristics of Islamic
fundamentalism that can be used to identify them. (1) Fundamentalists believe that
power cannot be shared and do not distinguish between short term and long-term
goals. (2) Fundamentalists rarely, if ever, have any theological training but may have
specialised training in other areas. (3) Islamic fundamentalists want to oversee the
application of Islamic law, which conforms, to the Shara. Islamic fundamentalists
disregard the Muslim clergy's role in the oversight of Islamic Law. (4) Islamic
fundamentalist requires a state because the use of violence by a state is legalised. (5)
Fundamentalists believe they have the right to take life.
Violence
The above concepts discussed have in common, the use of violence as a method to
achieve aims. Defining violence is controversial because violence is socially
constructed and the values of society determine what constitutes violence. Hoffman
and Mckendrick (1990) define violence as "the use of force to harm, injure and abuse
others".94 This definition does not state the methods and implements used to execute
violence. Violence can be further subdivided into wilful acts of violence, which
consists of legitimate or just violence and illegitimate or unjust violence. The legal
system and societal context within which the state agents conduct violence gives them
the legitimacy to conduct violence. Illegitimate violence is so regarded by society and
the state and is known as violent crime such as robbery and assault."
93Jansen, J.G. The Dual Nature ofIslamic Fundamentalism, London: Hurst, 1997, pp. 70-80.
94Mcendrick B and Hoffman W, People and Violence in South Africa, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990, pp.2-37.
95Degenaar, J. "The Concept of Violence," Chabani, M. and du Tiot, A. (eds.), Political Violence and
The Struggle in South Africa, Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers, 1990, pp.71-80.
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PAGAD's Mission and Objectives
PAGAD states in its mission statement that it is not aligned or affiliated to any
political movement. It's stated objectives are "to propagate the eradication of drugs
and gangsterism from society; to co-operate with and to co-ordinate the activities of
people and people's organisations, having similar aims and objectives; to make every
effort to invite/ motivate/ activate and to include those people and people's
organisations that are not yet part of PAGAD to join the campaign; to raise funds to
realise the foregoing aims". PAGAD further states that it is "a caring people's
movement, proceeding from a foundation of truth, unity and fearlessness, with the
ultimate aim of eradicating the evil scourge of gangsterism and drugs in society. We
propagate this eradication on the basis of and in accordance with, the Divine Will of
the Creator.,,96
PAGAD'S Organisational Structure
My analysis of PAGAD reveals that PAGAD is a complex organisation and that no
one theory captures the essence of the organisation. PAGAD has an elaborate
organisational structure consisting of a Working Team and various structures dealing
with specific issues, such as security, drug awareness, etc. The Working Team co-
ordinates the activities of all the structures. PAGAD has regional branches in the
Boland, Gauteng, Gauteng, Kwazulu Natal, The Southern Cape and the Western
Cape.The official positions that are held by members are the National Chief Co-
ordinator, Assistant National Chief Co-ordinator, National Chief of Security,
Assistant National Chief of Security, National Secretary, Assistant National Secretary,
National Treasurer, Assistant National Treasurer and each regional structure has Co-
ordinators with working teams and substructures."
96 http://www.pagad.co.za/netvision.htm. 6 May 1999.
97http://www.pagad.co.za/structure.htm. 6 May 1999.
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PAGAD: Demographic Profile of Members and Supporters
The group's leadership and supporters are predominantly Muslim. An Idasa survey
conducted between 1996 and 1997 show the following demographic data on the
group." PAGAD support base consists mostly of men, who are younger and Muslim.
Very few participants in the survey actually took part in collective action against
crime, but significant support for such activities were found. A large proportion of
the respondents said they would consider taking or would take part in collective action
such as signing petitions, attending rallies, boycott business with dealings with
criminals, march to police stations demanding the arrest of known criminals and
march on the houses of known criminals. The survey found an increase in support for
the use of force and violence in the 1997 survey.
The following core values distinguish those who would support intimidation and
those who would not. Fundamentalist values - those who believed in extreme
punishment and religious wars. Perception of safety - those who felt unsafe in the
neighbourhoods. Legal values - those who where less supportive of the rule of law.
Perception of ill treatment by police and courts - those who felt that the police and
courts treat people like themselves unequally. Performance rating of the police and
courts - those who disapprove of law enforcement agencies performance.
PAGAD and Public Opinion
In terms of PAGAD's support base, respondents in the survey sample where asked
who they thought PAGAD represented. Twenty nine percent of the Christian
respondents stated that PAGAD represents Muslims. Twelve percent of the Muslim
respondents stated that PAGAD represents Muslims.
98 "Crime and Community Action: PAGAD and the Cape Flats, 1996-1997," Public Service Reports,
IDASA no.4 June, 1998.
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Only two percent of the Muslim respondents and 5 percent of the Christian
respondents stated that PAGAD represented people against gangsters and drugs."
The question that needs to be asked is if according to public opinion, PAGAD
represents mostly Muslims and less likely people against gangsterism and drugs, in
which way does PAGAD represent Muslims? This question will be answered in this
section.
Literature Review of PAGAD
Daniel Nina sees PAGAD as a vigilante group by distinguishing it from popular
justice groups. Popular justice is the parallel justice system operated by the
community and has similar principles like that of the legal justice system operated by
the state. Vigilantism however is not governed by such codes and is more reactive
and defensive. The characteristics of popular justice such as people's courts, street
and disciplinary committees and was a feature of African Urban Areas of the 1980's.
These characteristics are absent from PAGAD and suggest to Nina that PAGAD is a
vigilante organisation. PAGAD however has a more sophisticated structure and has a
military like structure. The group sees a bipolar conflict between drug dealers and the
community. Most importantly, PAGAD has taken a particular position on the issue of
drugs and gangsterism by waging a war on drugs and gangsterism. Integral to the war
on drugs is the notion of the community. PAGAD has also reinvented the notion of
the 'community' formed by the anti-apartheid struggle for their own purposes. This
notion of the 'community' is to some extent encouraged by the state because the
present governments' rise to power was based on organisation of people's power in the
1980'S.lOOOne problem with Nina's interpretation of PAGAD is however, the failure
to attach significance to PAGAD's Islamic characteristics and its notion of a holy war
against drugs.
99 Ibid.,
100 Nina, "Popular Justice or Vigilantism? PAGAD, the State and the Community", pp. 1-4.
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Abulakader I Tayob view PAGAD as a group that displays characteristics of Islamic
fundamentalism. These characteristics are reflected in the groups', marches, wearing
of Palestinian scarves and slogans that are used. These are also characteristic of
international Islamic movements. These characteristics form part of the South
African Islamic discourse, which started in the 1950's. This discourse was inspired by
events in Egypt, Pakistan, and the South African political context. In the Western
Cape, this discourse was reflected in the Non European Unity Movement. Two views
of Islam were developed from this discourse. The collaborationist approach as held
by the Muslim Youth Movement and an anti-collaborationist, international view held
by Qibla. According To Abdulkader I, Tayob PAGAD's Islamic discourse is taken
from both these views. These are reflected by PAGAD's slogans, quotations from the
Qur'aan, meeting structure and wearing of Palestinian scarves.i'"
PAGAD's Links to Other Organisations
In 1996, the National Intelligence Agency in a report to the Cabinet Committee on
Intelligence claimed that PAGAD is the culmination of different groups co-ordinated
by Islamic militants, and supported by the broader society. The report claims that
evidence of armed training by its members, possibly by Iran has taken place.102 The
report further claims that the Lebanese Islamic group, HAMAS is in the process of
establishing a local base. Recruitment is believed to take place through front
organisations with PAGAD as a front organisation for HAMAS recruitment.i'"
It is believed that PAGAD has links to the Muslim organisation Qibla. Qibla was
formed under the leadership of Archmat Cassiem in 1987 in response to Apartheid.
Qibla holds an international view, which believes that Islam and democracy are
incompatible. Qibla has given life to the Islamic Unity Convention formed in 1994,
consisting of approximately 200 Muslim Organisations.
101 Tayob, A. I. "Jihad against Drugs in Cape Town: A Discourse-Centered Analysis in Social
Drnamics vol. 22, 1996, pp.23-29.
10 Qwelane, J. "Crimebusters or Vigilantes," in Tribute April 1997.
103 Ibid
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It is believed members of Qibla hold leadership positions in PAGAD. This
relationship between PAGAD and Qibla has influenced PAGAD's Islamic discourse.
According To Abdulakader, I.Toyab this discourse is reflected in PAGAD's marches,
the wearing of Palestinian scarves, the slogan and meeting structure.i'" Farid Esack
claims that there are fundamentalist forces within PAGAD. These fundamentalist
forces come from PAGAD's relationship with Qibla. Esack claims that Qibla's more
militant members have formed PAGAD and that PAGAD is guided by the ideological
guidance of Achmat Cassiem. lOS
PAGAD is believed to have links to the groups Muslims Against Global Oppression
(MAGO) and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL). MAGO has staged
several protest marches against the US and Britain in 1999 and against the visit of
Tony Blair in January 1999. PAGAD members were present at this march and one of
its members died. Yusuf Jacobs, a PAGAD member died after being hit in the temple
by a rubber bullet.106
MAIL is a recent creation and was formed at the end of 1998. It is believed that
MAGO and MAIL are front organisations of PAGAD and do not really exist. These
organisations take on ant-imperialist and anti- Zionist activities of PAGAD and are
more students orientated.
i04Toyab, "Jihad Against Drugs in Cape Town: A discourse Centered Analysis," pp. 23-29.
105 Farid, A. "PAGAD and Islamic Radicalism: Taking on the State", in Indicator South Africa
Vol.I3 Issue 4. Spring 1996, pp.7-11.
106 Erfert, C. "PAGAD warns of anarchy if protestor dies," Cape Argus, 11 January 1999.
106 Aranes, J., Schronen, J.and Smith, A. "Blair protester dies," Cape Argus, 12 January 1999.
106 Smith, A. and Tromp, B. "PAGAD fires parting shots for it's medic," Cape Argus, 13 January
1999.
See Aranes, 1., Schronen, J.and Smith, A. "Blair protester dies," Cape Argus, 12 January 1999.
See also Smith, A. and Tromp, B. "PAGAD fires parting shots for it's medic," Cape Argus, 13
January 1999.
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Analysis ofPAGAD
In order to describe, classify, and categorise PAGAD, the group's actions serve as the
only indicator by which it can be assessed according to the definitions discussed
earlier. For this purpose actions and activities that support the view that PAGAD is
an Islamic Fundamentalist group, that it is an organised crime group and that it is a
vigilante group will be reviewed. It should be noted that each view refutes the other
and that support for one view may indeed be evidence against another view. The
evidence for all three views can however not be ignored and I therefore hold that
PAGAD can be described as all three. Mark Shaw notes that vigilante groups may
attract criminal elements that use the organisation to secure their own objectives of
destroying the opposition, while gaining turf. Shaw also notes that vigilante groups
may splinter into different factions; some will be violent while others are less
violent.107
Support for view that PAGAD is an Islamic Fundamentalist Group
According to the characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalism, the fundamentalists
pursue both political and religious objectives. The religious objectives are the spread
of Islamic views on society while the political objectives is to take control of the state.
Fundamentalists rarely if ever have theological training to pursue religious courses but
have specialised training in other areas. Fundamentalists also disregard the role of
Muslim clergy in the overseeing of Islamic law and finally they hold the belief that,
they have the right to take life through religious justification.
PAGAD conforms to these characteristics. The group has a Muslim support base and
its leaders are Muslim. In it's mission statement a clear religious tone is taken by the
organisation which states that it propagates the eradication of gangsterism and drugs
in accordance with the Divine Will of the Creator. Other features conforming to a
fundamentalist discourse are the wearing of Palestinian scarves, use of Islamic
slogans and readings of the Quar'aan that the group quotes at its meetings and
marches.
107 Shaw, M. "Buying Time "Crime and Conflict, No.7, Spring 1997, pp. 5-6.
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Abdulkader I.Toyab sees the fundamentalist discourse reflected in these actions. Yet,
another important feature is that PAGAD has held its meetings in Mosques, thereby
excluding non-Muslims from getting involved in the organisation. Further,
representatives of the group have made several ant-Zionist statements and have
together with Muslims Against Global Oppression staged protest marches.l'"
PAGAD has not publicly stated that it wants South Africa to be an Islamic state but
the National Intelligence Agency claims that the group has links (if not stronger ties)
to Qibla and other organisations that propagate these ideas.
In so far as training in theology is concerned Imam Barendse arrested in connection
with pipe bombs found in his possession, is the only theologian publicly linked to the
group and acts it is linked to. When the group was formed in 1996 many theologians
as well as the Muslim Judicial Council publicly supported the group and PAGAD was
even launched from the Gateville Mosque.l'" PAGAD's G Force, the groups'
security structure is an element of the organisation in which members are believed to
have specialised training in security matters.
As stated previously when the group was formed in 1996 Muslim clergy and the
Muslim Judicial Council supported the group. By July 1999 Muslim theologians and
others have criticised the group. PAGAD's leadership retaliated by verbally attacking
clergy and those who criticise them. IlO
108 Erfert, C. "PAGAD warns of anarchy if protester dies," Cape Argus, Il January 1999.
109 Toyab, "Jihad Against Drugs in Cape Town: a discourse centered approach," pp.23-29.
110 Ismail, A. "Two respected scholars leave after threats: Radicals turn on Muslim leaders," Cape
Times, 13 September 1988.
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Support for the view that PAGAD is an Organised Crime Group
Keeping in mind the defmition of an organised crime group, PAGAD conforms to this
definition in the following ways. It is a collaboration of more than two people. Police
suspect that PAGAD is involved in serious criminal offences, such as the bombing of
police stations and the murder of police officer and gangsters.
In June, police arrested PAGAD members for the murder of police officer Bennie
Lategan. PAGAD's illegal activities are believed to have started in 1996. The group
is therefore suspected of involvement in such activity for a prolonged period. It is
claimed that the group motivated by a pursuit of power. It also employs commercial
and business-like structures.lIl PAGAD however has less of a business or
commercial structure but more of a state structure with a security wing. It uses
violence and other means as a means of intimidation and attempts to influence
politics, the media, and the judicial and public administration.
It is reported that PAGAD may be linked to gangs. Members of PAGAD's G force
security structure were arrested in connection with the murder of gangsters and police
officers.112 Furthermore, stolen property has also been found in the possession of
PAGAD members, which points to a criminal element within the organisation.l+'
III See discussion on PAGAD's organizational structure.
112 http://wviw2.inc.co.zaJArchives/1998/9805/22/pagad1205.html.. 23 June 1999.
113 Schronen, J. "Cops hold Imam in bomb raid," Cape Argus, 5 October 1998.
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Support for the view that PAGAD is a Vigilante Organisation
To classify actions as vigilante, certain criteria should be present. There should be
planning, pre-meditation, and organisation to acts committed. Private citizens should
act voluntarily. Citizens should be independent from other organisations. Crime and
social deviance should be rejected and citizens should claim that their personal and
collective security is being threatened. PAGAD conforms to the definition as in the
following way. Its activities such as marches, meetings, and rallies are planned. The
evidence suggests that PAGAD members act voluntarily and that it is an autonomous
organisation. It rejects gangsterism and drug use. Other evidence that is in support of
this view that PAGAD is concerned with the eradication of drugs is the drug
counselling centre opened and founded by the group early 1999.114
There is sufficient support for all these interpretations and it is for this reason that
PAGAD can be viewed as an Islamic fundamentalist group, an organised crime group
and a vigilante organisation. This interpretation holds that the different leaders of
PAGAD past and present had and have different aims, strategies and engage in
different activities to achieve their aims. Each leader has it's own support base and
this is one of the reasons that PAGAD supporters engage in contradictory activities.
This suggests that, as the groups' actions changed so did its support base. The three
distinct organisations thus emerged. The organising principle for PAGAD however
remains religion.
Farid Esack claims that PAGAD has incoherent leadership limited to two or three
people with different ideas of what PAGAD is and what their objectives are while
some call for an Islamic Revolution another claim they are a community organisation
who wants to rid the community of drugs. liS Esack claims that this contradiction
exists because Cassiem is exercising his influence from a safe distance. Esack claims
that PAGAD members can simultaneously belong to the various streams of ideology,
which make up PAGAD.
114 Cape Argus, 15 May 1999.
115 Esack, F. "PAGAD and Islamic Radicalism: Taking on the State," in Indicator South Africa vol.
13 no.4 , Spring, 1996, pp. 7 -Il.
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The confusion that exists with regards to PAGAD's objectives may also be due to the
many people holding leadership positions and the multitude of titles that PAGAD uses
for its leaders.
The organisation uses the titles of Chief Commander, Chief Co-ordinator. Aslam
Toefy, a founder member of PAGAD was called the Chief Commander, while Abdus
Salaam Ebrahim the present leader called the Chief Co-ordinator. It is not clear if
these titles refer to the same position or whether they are separate positions within the
organisation. At the same time, its executive members make public statements and it
is difficult to establish if they are the official representatives of the organisation. All
of these make it difficult to identify the organisations leaders from members and the
group, as a whole can therefore not be held accountable for what is said and done.
The Many Voices of PAGAD
PAGAD has various spokespersons who all bring their own influence on the
organization and who possibly represent the different organizations within PAGAD.
Cassiem Parker commented on the arrests of three of its members concerning the
Planet Hollywood bombing in August 1998. Abeeda Roberts commented on the
arrest of six of it's members in connection with pipe bombs found in their possession
in September 1998 and Goolam Alie commented on the murder of captain Lategan in
January 1999.
Leadership Changes within PAGAD
Under the leadership of Aslam Toefy PAGAD tried to broaden its support base while
under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim the support base is narrowed to
Muslims. Under the Toefy leadership, PAGAD and the police had a more
accommodating relationship and police and PAGAD held various talks and meetings
for a better working relationship. Under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim,
PAGAD and the police have been in conflict, with PAGAD becoming increasingly
critical of police. The group's relationship with the media has always been stormy but
has soured since the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim.
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Other Comments
PAGAD's complicated organisational structure may be an attempt to confuse the
police. The National Co-ordinator, who holds the highest position in the organisation,
may indeed not be heading PAGAD. PAGAD also does not have one agenda but
many depending on which leader is dominant. Further PAGAD appeals to many
different people due to the wide range of actions the organisation engages in. The
different organisations as the earlier analysis reveal appeal to gangs, fundamentalists,
and anti drug activists alike. The claim that PAGAD has links to the international
Islamic groups HAMAS, is most unlikely but not impossible and some training of
PAGAD members by Iran may have taken place.
PAGAD and National Security and Government Security
It light of the above discussion PAGAD may be viewed as a threat to national security
and a threat to the government. If PAGAD is an organised crime or vigilante group, it
is chiefly a threat to the government because the major indication of government
strength and efficiency is indicated by how well it deals with crime. If PAGAD is an
Islamic fundamentalist organisation, who's aim it is to establish an Islamic state, then
PAGAD is a threat to national security. The establishment of an Islamic state is a
threat to South Africa's territorial integrity and state institutions.
Summary
The term is used to describe activities of vigilante groups, Islamic fundamentalists,
and organised crime groups. Vigilantism and organised crime are similar as both
break the law, are organised, and use violence to achieve their aims. The major
difference is however; those organised crime groups seek financial gain. Islamic
fundamentalism is a term used to describe groups that pursue both religious and
political aims. In most cases members have no theological training but have other
specialised training with which they try to pursue their religious and political aims.
Further fundamentalists want to oversee the application of Islamic law, while
disregarding the role of the Islamic clergy.
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Finally it is use to describe groups and individuals who believe that they have the
right to take life. All these terms have in common the use of violence to achieve their
aims. These definitions when applied to PAGAD reveal the following. Since it's
existence a new type of violence has emerged in the Western Cape, commonly
referred to as "terrorism" and "urban terrorism". PAGAD may be described and
classified as a fundamentalist organisation, an organised crime group, and a vigilante
organisation. The evidence for this interpretation comes from the contradictory
activities members ofPAGAD engage in.
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CHAPTER 5: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Introduction
The chronology was compiled by looking at vanous incidents of murder; bomb
attacks protest marches and other incidents that have taken place in the Western Cape
between August 1998 and December 1999. The chronology relied on press coverage
of events and information obtained from press sources. The media's coverage of
violent events is however, prejudiced and very often flawed and should be read and
used critically. Internationally, the media's coverage of terrorism is selective and
politically shaped with the use of unreliable statistical information and blatant
political uses of such statistics. News coverage of terrorist events is usually devoid of
historical facts and social contexts of these events. This is suggested by the research
undertaken by David L. Paletz, Peter A. Fozzard and Jon Z. Ayanian analysing the
New York Times coverage of the Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigade, the
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaraan Nacional of Venezuela from July 1 1977 to June 30
1979. It was found that 70 percent of the stories covered in the New York Times did
not mention the cause or objectives of the terrorists. Seventy-five percent did not
mention the organisation thought to be responsible or its members. Those articles in
which the organisations' name or that of its members did so in the context of
statements issued by authorities. Events are often dramatised with reports focusing on
a specific event, selecting details of this event and arranging it in a story form as a
drama to the audience. Jl6
In South African media has set the precedent for how bombings and shootings are
addressed by authorities and how the public views these events. The media coined the
term urban terrorism subsequently used by politicians and the police to refer to violent
acts discussed by the paper.
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Chronology of Events
6 August 1998
A pipe bomb explodes outside the police headquarters of the PAGAD and Gang
Violence, Special Investigating Unit in Belville. One person is killed and others are
injured. At the same time a PAGAD member is in court for a bail hearing. He was
arrested for being in possession of explosives on 30 July, when the bakkie he and
others where driving exploded. Two occupants of the bakkie died in this incident. 117
7 August 1998
The United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are bombed. At least 132 people
die and 4 200 others are injured. The US claims that exiled Saudi, Osama bin Laden
is responsible for the attacks. Bin Laden earlier threatened that a Holy War would
take place against US soldiers and civilians. I IS
8 August 1998
Five people die execution style in Belhar, in what is believed to be a gang related
incident. According to police the killers where professional.i'Ï
18 August 1998
APAGAD member is arrested for the bomb blast outside the police-investigation unit
in Belville on 6 August. 120
21 August 1998
The US launches missile attacks on "terrorist" bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. In
Sudan a pharmaceutical plant, the US claims manufactured nerve gas is targeted and
in Afghanistan, apparent terrorist training camps are bombed. In Afghanistan 15
people are believed to have died in the attack.121
116 Alexander, Y and Picard, R. (ed.) In the Cameras Eye: News Coverage of Terrorist Events,
Washington: Brassey's, 1991, pp. 6-32.
117 Staff Reporter, "Women dies as bombers target police," Cape Times, 7 August 1998.
118 Foreign Correspondent, "We'll fmd the terrorists who did it, says Clinton," Sunday Times, 8/9
August 1998.
119 Waring, T.W. and Daniels, L. "5 die in execution," Sunday Argus, 8/9 August 1998.
120 Staff Reporter, "Belville blast suspects' a G Force member," Cape Time, 18 August 1998.
121 Staff Reporter, "US brasses for revenge attacks," Cape Argus, 21 August 1998.
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25 August 1998
The American owned Planet Hollywood restaurant at the Victoria and Alfred
Waterfront in Cape Town is bombed. Two people die and 26 others are injured. A
Cape Town radio station received a telephone call shortly after the blast from a
Muslim group called Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) claiming
responsibility for the blast. The group later denied responsibility for the blast. 122
26 August 1998
Three members of PAGAD are arrested in connection with the bomb blast at the
planet Hollywood restaurant on 25 August 1998 but are later freed. PAGAD criticises
the police for the arrests and later the that same evening approximately 100 members
of PAGAD hold a protest at the home of Justice Minister, Dullar Omar, to protest
against the arrests of it's members.123
29 August 1998
The group Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) holds a protest march to the
US embassy. Approximately 1 000 supporters called for the closure of the US
embassy in Cape Town, an investigation into the US claims of nerve gas
manufacturing in the Sudan factory and legal actions against the US air strikes against
Sudan and Afghanistan.l'"
7 September 1998
PAGAD holds a march in Paarl and clashes with the community. PAGAD vows to
continue with marches and to deploy its G force to patrol areas.125
122Weiss, A. "You evil cowards," Cape Times, 26 August 1998.
123S ffta Reporter, "PAGAD targets Omar after blast arrests," Cape Argus, 28 August 1998.
124StaffReporter, "Muslims march on US embassy," Sunday Argus, 29/30 August 1998.
125J hosep Aranes and Johan Schronen, "PAGAD vows to march on after clash," Cape Argus, 7
September 1998.
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13 September 1998
Several Muslim clergy and academics leave South Africa after threats and pipe bomb
attacks on their homes.!"
4 October 1998
Six members of PAGAD are arrested when police raid their homes. Imam Barendse
is arrested when two unexploded pipe bombs and a stolen car are found at the Imam's
home.127
14 October 1998
Jeremy Sniper of the Sexy Boys gang is killed.
4 November 1998
Gangster Bobby Mongrel is shot at his home in Grassy Park.
11 November 1998
Gangster, Neville Herold alias Jacky Lonte is shot at his home in Athlone. In May
PAGAD members marched to his home.128
25 November 1998
PAGAD member, Faizel Samsodien appear in court in connection with the murder of
Neville Herold.129
126 Ayesha Ismail, "Two respected shoals leave after threats: Radicals turn on Muslim leaders," Cape
Times, 13 September 1998.
127 Schronen, J. "Cops hold Imam in bomb raid," Cape Argus, 5 October 1998.
128 http://www2.inc.co.za/Archives/1998/9805/25/pagad 1205.html, 23 June 1999.
129 http://www2.inc.co.za/ArchivesIl998/9811/30Ionte2411.html, 23 June 1999.
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12 December 1998
Achmat Thomas, member of the gang the Ciseko Yukkies IS gunned down lil
Althone.I30
15 December 1998
Police confiscate the gun of PAGAD's National Co-ordinator, Abdus Salaam
Ebrahim at the bail hearing of PAGAD member Ebrahim Jeneker. Mr. Jeneker was
arrested in connection with a robbery of a minibus in Manenberg; the same day gang
leader Ismail was shot dead. Mr. Jeneker was also charged with the murder of
gangster Moegamat Kadali, four charges of attempted murder and stealing a
firearm. 13 I
17 December 1998
The US leads air Strikes against Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons plants.
According 0 the US Iraq's nuclear weapons is a threat to its neighbours. Five people
are killed and 30 others are injured in Baghdad.132
18 December 1999
A pipe bomb explodes outside the Wynberg synagogue no one was injured. 133
1 January 1999
A car bomb explodes at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape Town. The bomb
was planted in a white Toyota Corolla reported stolen in Goodwood. Police
investigating the blast claims that it may have something to do with the movie, the
Siege that is said to be anti-Muslim.134
130 Damon, J. "Kahn killing brings gangster killings to 12," Cape Argus, 6 April 1999.
131 Smith, A. "Anger erupts as PAGAD leaders gun is seized," Cape Argus, 15 December 1998.
132 Foreign Correspondent, "Bill's blitz delays fate", Cape Argus, 17 December 1998.
133 http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99decl/l0dec-bomb2.html.. 28 March 2000.
134 Schronen, 1., Cameron, J. and William Steenkamp, "Bomb probe disaster", Sunday Argus, 2/3
January 1999.
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3 January 1999
Armed masked men rob the Claremont police station of R5 assault rifles, shotguns,
pistols, radios; bulletproof vests and R3 600 in bail money.13S
Edmund Herold, bother of Neville Herold is killed in a drive-by shooting.
7 January1999
The group Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) holds illegal demonstrations
outside the US embassy. Three demonstrators are arrested for being in possession of
guns. The protest was held against British and US air strikes against Iraq, three weeks
earlier.
Muslims Against Global Oppression hold demonstrations against the visit of British
Prime Minister Tony Blair's visit to South Africa. According to the police three
people where arrested for being in possession of firearms.
The Athlone branch of Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet was petrol bombed. The
damage is estimated at R 50 000.136
8 January 1999
Five people are injured when police shoot rubber bullets at protesters at the Castle of
Good Hope. The protest is held against the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair's visit
to South Africa. According to police, handguns where handed out to protestors from
two cars. PAGAD claims that the police used excessive force against protesters.
Yusuf Jacobs, a PAGAD member was hit in temple by a rubber bullet.
135 Staff Reporter, "Security firms to rescue as city cops hit panic button," Cape Argus, 28 June 1999.
136 Aranes, J. "KFC petrol bombed," Cape Argus, 8 January 1999.
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10 January 1999
Members of the groups PAGAD and MAGO hold a protest march at the Victoria and
Alfred Waterfront to protest against police brutality. PAGAD's Chief of Security
threatens that the country will be made ungovernable if Yusuf Jacobs is to die.137
12 January 1999
Yusuf Jacobs dies, after being hit by rubber bullet, when police opened fire on
protesters on Friday. The South African Defence Force and police go on standby in
case of unrest after medic Yusuf Jacobs dies.13B Yusuf Jacobs is buried from the
home of PAGAD National Co-ordinator, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim. Mr. Ebrahim
demands that the person responsible for the death of Mr. Yusufbe dealt with. 139
13 January 1999
The South African Police announce a new operation, Operation Good Hope to replace
the PAGAD investigating unit. Ganief Daniels is the head of the operation that has a
running cost of R 4 million per month. Operation Good Hope will deploy more
resources to the Western Cape.140
14 January 1999
Policeman Bennie Lategan is shot while driving home from work. Captain Lategan
was part of the PAGAD investigating team. Police raid the homes of PAGAD
members Ebrahim Jeneker and National Co-ordinator Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, after
Lategan's death.141
25 January 1999
Moemeeb Abrahams of the gang the Hard Livings is killed in Manenberg.
137 Erfert, C. "PAGAD warns of anarchy if protestor dies," Cape Argus, Il January 1999.
138 Aranes, J., Schronen, J.and Smith, A. "Blair protester dies," Cape Argus, 12 January 1999.
139 Smith, A. and Tromp, B. "PAGAD fifes parting shots for it's medic," Cape Argus, 13 January
1999.
140 Aranes, J. "PAGAD cops get the boot," Cape Argus, 13 January 1999.
141 Aranes, J and Schronen, J. "PAGAD raids follow killing", Cape Argus, 15 January 1999.
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Operation Good Hope is launched.142
28 January 1999
A bomb explodes outside the Caledon Square police station in Cape Town at
lunchtime. Eleven people are injured by the blast. Police raid the home of Imam
Barendse, who was arrested in 1998 when two pipe bombs were found in his
possession.Y
The police claim that PAGAD is plarming to attack police 'officers that worked with
murdered captain Lategan, after several police officers receive death threats.i'"
30 January 1999
A bomb explodes at the Woodstock police station. The bomb was thrown underneath
a parked car in Victoria Street. One person was injured by the blast.145
1 February 1999
Police arrest 6 members of PAGAD's G force security structure. The vehicle was
stopped and a video of seven police stations in the Cape Town area was seized from
the occupants in the bakkie. Police also found one legal firearm and four balaclavas.
While in custody, police forcibly took hair, saliva and blood samples from PAGAD
members arrested. PAGAD attorneys argued this as unconstitutional and Justice
Dennis Davis ruled that all samples taken must be destroyed. 146
142 http://www2.ine.co.zalArehives/1999/99051l4/lead12html. 23 June 1999.
143 Cape Argus, 29 January 1999.
144 http://www2.inc.co.zalArchives/1999/990 1/28/donpag.httml., 23 June 1999.
145 Graig, J and Steenkamp, 1. "Police bombed again," Sunday Argus, 30 131 January 1999.
146 http:ltwww.suntimes.co.zalsuntimesarehivet1999t05t02/newstcape/net03.htm .• 21 June 1999.
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3 February 1999
Police arrest six PAGAD members in Outshoorn and found firearms in the vehicle
they were traveling in. It is latter revealed that Ayob Mungalee, PAGAD's Gauteng
coordinator was an informer for the National Intelligence Agency.147 Mungalee also
claimed that the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) had asked him to transport
explosives to Cape Town, while the NIA denies Mungalee's allegations. 148
19 February 1999
Schalk Visagie, a member of the PAGAD and Gang Investigating Unit is shot and
seriously wounded while driving on the MS. 149 Gunmen opened fire from a white
VW Caravelle found hours latter set alight in Maitland. Visagie was unarmed and
managed to climb out of his car and seek cover behind the boot of his car. ISO
7 April 1999
Businessman Adam Vinoos is killed in a drive-by shooting in his Gatesville fast food
restaurant, while his cousin is shot in the back and fatally wounded. Vinoos and his
son Faizel were earlier summoned by PAGAD to appear in front of the community to
answer allegations of drug selling. lSI
10 April 1999
Three women are shot dead in a hair salon in Grassy Park. Police believe the to be
incident is gang related.
147 http://www2.inc.co.za/Archives! 1999/9905/14/lead 12.html., 23 June 1999.
http://www.mg.co.za/news/99/feb-pagad.html.. 28 March 2000.
148 http://archive.iol.co.za!Archives/1999/9903/J/pagadwrap.html., 27 March 2000.
149 http://www2.inc.co.za/ArchivesII999/9905/14/lead12.htm. 23 June 1999.
150 http://archive.iol.co.za/Archives/1999/990?/26/bit.htmL 27 March 2000.
151 http://.sllntimes.co.za/suntimesarchive/1999/06/13/news/cappe/nct03.htm., 21 June 1999.
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19 April 1999
Police find four vehicles believed to have been used in violent attacks at a house in
Brooklyn, Cape Town. One of the vehicles, a VW Jetta is identified as the vehicle
use in the shooting of Adam Vinoos and Rafliek Parklet, Glen Khan and PAGAD
investigator Garry Chamberlain. 152 Two PAGAD members where arrested in
connection with these vehicles in Kleinvlei and latter appeared in COurt.1S3
4 May 1999
The Michells Plain home of drug dealer Mogamat Madat was bombed. According to
witnesses a group of men drove past the house and throw a pipe bomb at the house.
No one was injured in the blast.1S4
9 May 1999
A bomb explodes outside the police station in Athlone. Hours earlier a member of the
public informed police that the bomb would explode. The bomb was placed under a
car parked outside the police station. 155
30 June 1999
The Argus reports that magistrate Robert Henney refused bail to Moegsien Barendse
and Riedwaan Hendricks.
Farouk Jaffer, founder member of PAGAD is killed prior to testifying in a number of
court cases involving PAGAD national co-ordinator, Abdus Salaam Ebrahiem. Jaffer
was an informer for the police intelligence services since 1996.
152 http://iol/co.za/ArchivesIl999/9904/20/brktr.html., 27 March 2000.
153 http://iol.co.za/Archives/1999/99041l9/arrestI5.html., 27 March 2000.
154 http://archive.iol.co.za/Archive/1999/9905/11/wcape0505.html., 22 March 2000.
155 http://archive.iol.co.za/Archives/1999/9905/14/lead12.htm1., 22 March 2000.
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30 June - 13 July 1999
Police arrest six PAGAD members for a range of incidents including the shooting of
three women in the Grassy Park hair salon in April and the murder of Bennie Lategan
in January. 156
6 November 1999
A gay bar, the Blah Bar is bombed and nine people are injured. Police arrest Deon
Mostert for the blast. Mostert latter claims that he is a police informant and claim that
police are behind the spite of bombings in the Western Cape.157
28 November 1999
A bomb explosion hits St. Elmo's pizzeria in Camps Bay. Forty-eight people are
injured in the blast. 158
24 December 1999
An explosion outside a restaurant injures seven police officers; one officer was
seriously injured. The bomb was planted in a bin outside Mano's restaurant and
exploded at 10h30. 159
156http://w.Ww.mg.co.za/mglnews/99jul-pagad.html.. 28 March 2000.
157http://www.mg.co.zaJmglnews/99dec1/10dec-bomb2.html.. 28 March 2000.
158http://www.mg.co.zaJmg/news/99dec1l10dec-bomb2.html.. 28 March 2000.
159http://www.mg.co.zaJmgzaJarchives/99dec/27dec-news.html.. 28 March 2000.
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS Of EVENTS
Introduction
This chapter analyses the frequency, distribution, and patterns of violent acts from
August 1998 to December 1999. It assesses three acts described as "terrorism" or
"urban terrorism" according to the definition discussed in Chapter 2. In the seventeen
months, from August 1998 to December 1999 the frequency in which violent acts
occurred where not the same for each month, specific patterns in which violent acts
occur can be observed. This chapter holds that these violent acts are a form of
communication.
The three acts to be given appropriate labels are:
(1) The Planet Hollywood bombing restaurant in August 1998.
(2) The murder of police officer Bennie Lategan in January 1999.
(3) The murder of gang leader Neville Herold in November 1999.
How Acts Were Chosen
(1) Diversity of targets
(2) Diversity of settings
(3) Method used
The Planet Hollywood bombing signifies a trend in violence in the Western Cape in
which the targets are businesses owned by private individuals. The Planet Hollywood
restaurant is an American owned company. The restaurant is situated at the Victoria
and Alfred Waterfront, a major tourist attraction in Cape Town. The Planet
Hollywood bombing is an indication that the violence has spread from the Cape Flats
to the city and business areas. A pipe bomb was used in this incident.
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Gang leader Neville Herold was shot by unknown men outside his home in November
1998. Herold's death was one of many murders on gangsters in the Cape Flats since
October 1998. In most of the murders, gangsters were shot with military type
ammunition. Police officer Bennie Lategan was an investigator employed at the
PAGAD and Gang Investigation Unit, set up by the South African Police. Lategan's
death is one of many attacks on the police.
The Planet Hollywood Bomb Blast
The question to ask is what label should be attached to the Planet Hollywood bomb
blast. The US, State Department report on terrorism, titled Patterns of Global
Terrorism viewed 273 acts as terrorist in 1998 and classified the Planet Hollywood
bombing as a terrorist act. In order to answer the question, I refer to the definitions of
terrorism discussed in Chapter 2 and evaluate this act according to these definitions.
The Planet Hollywood bombing does not conforms to the definition of terrorism as
used by the paper. The bomb was wrapped in a shirt and placed in between counters
and a timing device set off the explosion. This indicates that the bombing was a
highly organized and planned activity. No threat and or subsequent claim of
responsibility has been made, although shortly after the blast a person claiming to
represent the group Muslims Against Global Oppression said the group was
responsible for the blast, the group latter denied responsibility for the blast. The
important objective, absent from this incident is the motive to in the overthrow of
government as should be the case if the definition as used by the paper is applied.
The Killing of Neville Herold
The killing of gangster Neville Herold also does not conform to the definition of
terrorism as used by this paper. But when the definition of Moss is applied this act
may be viewed as an act of defensive terror if certain assumptions are made about the
act and its perpetrators.
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It can be assumed that considerable planning, pre-mediation and organisation was
involved in this act. Herold was at home when two gunmen opened fire on him. This
suggests that the killers did some research into Herold's routine, when he would be
home etc. The assumption can also be made that private citizens acting without co-
operation from other sources undertook this act. The assumption is also made that the
killing of a gangster means that crime and deviance was rejected. This act can
however just as easily be labelled as an action of an organised crime group.
The Killing of Policeman Bennie Lategan
Captain Lategan was shot while driving home from work. The incident occurred on
the R 300, at approximately seven 0' clock in the evening. This act conforms to the
definition of a terrorist act. The way in which this act was executed conforms to the
definition of terrorism. Captain Lategan was employed by the state. As the act was
committed in public and on a busy road while Lategan was on his way home, suggests
that the act was planned and carefully organised. The perpetrators possibly followed
Lategan and knew his routine. The most important element in this act is that Lategan
was a police officer employed by the state and an attack on an officer of the state is
usually seen as an attack on the state or government.
Frequencies and Distribution of Violent Acts
It should be noted that no person and or group has claimed responsibility for any of
the violent acts that occurred between August 1998 and January 1999. In same
instances it is not clear whom the intended targets where. These acts however hold
symbolic significance for the perpetrator.
In August 1998 three violent events occurred. Two significant pipe bomb attacks
occurred in this month. The targets in each case where however different. In the first
incident the police headquarters of the PAGAD and Gang Violence Special
Investigating Unit was the target and in the other the American owned Planet
Hollywood restaurant was the target.
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September was however a quieter month, with no significant acts of violence.
October saw one significant violent act, the killing of gangster Jeremy Sniper of the
gang, The Sexy Boys. November saw the continuation of the killings of gangsters,
with the killing of three gangsters in drive-by attacks. December was a quieter month
with only one significant act of violence, that being the murder of gangster Achmat
Thomas. January is the month with the highest number of violent acts. Violent acts
during this month had various targets. On New Years' day a car bomb exploded at
the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, therefore not therefore clear who or what the
target is of this act. This is however an act of great symbolic significance. Two
demonstrations turned violent and one person died and several others where injured
during these demonstrations. The police where the target of four incidents in this
month. Two of the bomb attacks occurred outside police stations, one of these the
murder of a police officer and the other a robbery at a police station. In February
1999, one violent attack occurred on police officer Schalk Visagie. While in April
1999, two violent incidents occurred, targets were the business owners. InMay 1999
two incidents occurred, while in June 1999 Fourouk Jaffer, PAGAD founder member
was shot. After a period of relative peace, two attacks occurred in November 1999
while one attack occurred in December 1999.
The Targets of Violent Acts
From the discussion of the months in review, several observations can be made.
There are multiple targets of violence in the Western Cape. These various targets may
suggest that much conflict exists. In seven violent acts from August 1998 to January
1999, gangsters where the targets. The police were the targets of seven acts of
violence. In one incident the target was unknown and in three violent incidents the
targets where American linked businesses. Five protest marches where held during
this period. Two of the protest marches where held one against the United States and
another against Britain's involvement in international affairs of the Middle East.
One of the protest marches was about gangsterism and two others where against state
officials. Of the five protest marches two turned violent. In two attacks in April
1999, business owners were the targets of attacks. In one incident in November 1999,
a gay bar was the target.
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The Diverse Methods of Violence
Pipe bombs where used as the means of attack in eight violent attacks. In fourteen
acts of violence the targets where shot or shot guns where used in the attack. Five of
these acts were drive-by shootings, while others occurred at the individuals' home.
Attacks on police stations rarely occur directly. Inmost cases, bombs are left outside
the police stations in cars or trashcans. In attacks in the latter part of 1999
sophisticated detonators where used. These detonators were modified cellular
telephones. The Christmas Eve bombing of Mano's restaurant police officers were
the targets of this attack. Perpetrators lured police to the empty restaurant minutes
before the bomb exploded. What is observed is that different form or methods of
execution of violence are used for different targets. When the targets are gangsters,
the method of violence is either drive by shootings or bomb attacks. When the
targets are business owners, the method of attack is also drive by shootings but when
the targets are business bomb attacks are the methods of attack.
The Pattern of Violence
Reviewing the seventeen months a pattern of violence emerges, which suggest that the
majority of these violent acts are planned and carefully executed. The only
spontaneous or uncalculated outbursts of violence occur at demonstrations. From
August 1998 to January 1999, 'big acts' are followed by 'small acts'. A big act is the
bomb explosion at the Planet Hollywood restaurant and 'small acts' are the murders of
gangsters. 'Big acts' are for the public audience, while it seems that 'small acts are
for a smaller audience perhaps those related to the gangsters. 'Big acts' are
perpetrated in public, meaning places where the public frequent, while 'small acts' are
perpetrated usually but not exclusively at the targets' home.
When the targets are the police, a more interesting pattern emerges. Attacks on
individual police officers are preceded by an attack on a police station as in the case
of Bennie Lategan and Schalk Visagie. From 1996 to early 1998, business owners
were the targets of frequent violent attacks this was however not the case from late
1998 to early 1999.
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In April 1999 two business owners where however attacked, no specific pattern can
be identified from this. Both the business owners were allegedly connected to gangs
and the drug trade before their deaths. No identifiable pattern is observed for the
attacks that occurred in the latter part of 1999, yet three violent attacks occurred in a
period of seven weeks.
Another pattern that emerges from 1998 to 1999 is that bombings follow the arrest or
trial of PAGAD members. In August 1998, aPAGAD member was on trial for
possession of explosives, later that same week a bomb exploded outside the police
headquarters in Belville. In February 1999, PAGAD members where arrested for
possession of firearms and ammunition, later that same month Schalk Vissagie was
shot and wounded. InApril and May 1999 police arrested several PAGAD members
for the murders of business owners earlier in the year, the police station in Athlone
was bombed soon after. The relative peace between May 1999 and November 1999
may be attributed to the arrest of several of PAGAD's core members in May and
during the course of the year.
Communication to Audiences
The form in which violence take place, the method of execution, the environment and
context in which violent attacks take place have communicative value and should be
analysed. Each form of violence that has taken place in the Western Cape appears to
communicate with different audiences. Protest marches, bombings and drive-by
shootings are the major forms in which violence has taken place. It is clear from the
diverse methods used that some methods of attack or meant to scare, wound, damage
property or kill the targets. This also indicates that the attacks are carefully planned
and executed to meet the objectives of the perpetrators. Bomb attacks on police
stations are usually indirect and tend to be less focussed on inflicting injury than and
more focussed on highlighting the powerlessness of police to bring the perpetrators to
book. The bomb blast at the Athlone police station and Woodstock police station are
examples.
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Bomb attacks on gangsters have killed few people and it does appear that the aim is to
kill but rather to scare them. Bomb attacks on police and bomb attacks on business,
specifically American linked business appear to be executed with the intention of
scaring, wounding and killing the targets. Nevertheless, it does appear, as though the
prime objective is to kill.
Protest Marches
Protest marches communicate several messages to various audiences. Political actors
domestically and internationally, supporters of PAGAD as well as police and justice
officials. Marches aimed at international actors, such the march against the visit of
British Prime Minister Tony Blair send the message that South Africans Muslims
sympathise with the plight of Muslims around the world. This indicates that Muslims
are a homogeneous group that will support each other. The message to local
politicians seems to be more or less the same. It also suggests that South African
politicians may not be in control of the Western Cape, more especially since the
march was illegal. The march also seems to communicate to PAGAD supporters that
it is able to operate above the law and without reproach and that it is a strong
organisation ready to take up arms against those who threatened them. PAGAD may
have gained support among those in favour of an Islamic state. PAGAD marches
against gangsterism and drugs have a clear message i.e. to stop drug dealing and other
activities. The motive behind this message is however more important than the
message itself. The motives may be to stop drug sales for the sake of a less drug
dependent community or to wam rival drug dealers and gangsters not to undercut their
trade and turf.
Bomb Attacks
Bomb attacks also communicate several messages to various audiences. If the bomb
attack is aimed at gangsters and drug dealers, the message is however more 'personal'
and is aimed at smaller audience i.e. the individual themselves, their family and the
fellow drug dealers and gangsters.
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When the target of the bomb attack is a public restaurant or police station the audience
the bomber is reaching is larger and includes the public, politicians, police and justice
officials as well as the supporters of the group and or person responsible. The Planet
Hollywood bombing is a case in point. The clear message communicated is the power
of the bomber to strike at anytime and against anyone. When a police station is
attacked it tends to be more symbolic and highlights the vulnerability and inability of
the police to deal with crime and the message is that the bomber is more powerful,
more organised and in control of the situation.
Drive by Shootings
Drive by shootings during the period under study has had a variety of targets. The
targets include gangsters, business owners, and police officers. As in the case on
bomb attacks on gangsters, drive by attracts, tend to communicate with a smaller
audience, the gangster himself, his family and the other members of his gang. Attacks
on business owners may also be directed against a smaller audience. When the targets
are police officers messages are sent to broader audiences. These audiences are the
police themselves, politicians, and the public.
The NIA and Police Involvement in Violence in the Western Cape
The alleged involvement of the NIA agents and police officers in violence in the
Western Cape has complicated the analysis of events. The police watchdog, The
independent Complaints Directorate is investigating police involvement in violence
and as yet no evidence with absolute certainty link NIA agents and the police to
violence in the Western Cape.
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Summary
The frequency with which violence acts occurred over the fifteen-month period from
August 1998 to January 1999 where different for each month. The targets as well as
the method used in acts where also different. In January 1999 the highest incidents of
violent acts occurred. The targets of violence were evenly distributed over the six
months, but gangsters where targeted mostly in November 1998 and the police in
January. The violent acts also took on a pattern emerging in January 1999 in which
'big acts' preceded 'small acts". It was found that neither the Planet Hollywood
bombing or the killing of Neville Herold is a terrorist act according to the definition
used by this paper. The killing of captain Lategan is however a terrorist act.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS
South Africa has experienced high levels of violence since the early 1990's and a
particular type of violence called terrorism or urban terrorism by the media,
politicians and the police have emerged in the Western Cape. Acts that are so
described are the bombing of business, police stations and the homes of gangsters;
drive-by shootings in which the targets are police officers, gangsters and those related
to gangsters. A number of issues have contributed to this type of violence flourishing
in the Western Cape. Among these reasons are the weakening of the state due to
Apartheid policies and the subsequent political transformation in the late 1980's and
early 1990's which has left both the state and society vulnerable to individuals and
groups interested in acquiring power. This has crippled the consolidation of
democracy and is a threat to the safety and security of citizens.
This research has indicated that the police themselves do not have a coherent
definition of terrorism or urban terrorism. A senior police official however states that
not all these incidents are declared by police to be acts of urban terror. When asked
which criteria the police use to define urban terror the following was mentioned. (1)
A vigilante group should be suspected of involvement in the act. (2) Gangsters, police
and others should be the targets. Itwas stated that in certain instances the target is not
clearly identified this is usually when a house is the target. When asked why acts
labelled as terrorist or urban terrorist do not appear on official crime statistics, the
officer stated that this type of violence is particular to the Western Cape and therefore
not a national issue. When asked why this criterion is not made public the officer said
that this criterion was only used internally by the police to label an act.160 The failure
to make public these criteria has lead to many acts wrongly labelled as acts of urban
terror. Apart from this the definition of terrorism and urban terrorism used by the
Western Cape police does not conform to the definition of terrorism as used by the
paper. The paper set out to evaluate these labels and where necessary to find credible
labels for such acts.
160 Telephone interview with senior police official, 2 September 1999.
93
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The definition of terrorism used by this paper is as follows. Terrorism is deliberate
action against groups and individuals involving relatively organised and planned
activity on the part of small but cohesive groups, with the aim of inflicting fear,
damage, and death on targets. The targets may be government property and personnel
and other citizens. Bombings, kidnapping, hijackings, sabotage and massacres are
used as a means to achieve the perpetrators aims, with the ultimate objective to
overthrow the government.
The paper then looked at possible reasons for the increases in violence, conflict, and
crime to be found throughout the country and in the Western Cape and found the
following. High crime rates, protection rackets, private armies, and tax revolts,
informal economies, and corruption indicate the weak state. The Departments of
Justice and Safety and Security face several problems which preventing the
implementation of their duties and added to this is the uncoordinated intelligence
operations. The most noticeable failures of the Departments of Safety and Security
and Justice are the lack of arrest and conviction for those involved in PAGAD and
gang related incidents in the Western Cape. Other problems are the lack of
transformation in the two departments, absenteeism, and corruption. Contributing to
the low number of arrests and conviction is the conflict between the national
government and the Western Cape provincial legislature and the lack of an official
definition of terrorism by the government. While the alleged involvement of NIA
agents in violence in the Western Cape is an obstacle the Department of Intelligence
must overcome.
Police identifies the group PAGAD as the key actor involved in violence and conflict
in the Western Cape. This group emerged in 1996 as an anti-drug group but soon
after its inception, its members engaged in activities other than their originally stated
objectives. This paper analyzed and classified the group according to the actions that
it has engaged in and found that PAGAD can be labeled as a vigilante organization,
an organized crime group and an Islamic fundamentalist organization. This
interpretation holds that the various leaders of PAGAD past and present have their
own support base, strategy and objectives to achieve their aims. This is one of the
reasons that PAGAD members engage in contradictory activities.
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The paper then set out to establish a chronology of violent events in the Western Cape
between August 1998 and December 1999 and found that January 1999 had the
highest incidents of violence. Violence in January 1999 was also directed at multiple
targets, which included police stations, a police officer, gangsters, and an unclear
target. The paper than set out to find appropriate labels for the Planet Hollywood
bombing, the murder of gangster Neville Herold and police officer Bennie Lategan. It
was found that the killing of Bennie Lategan is a terrorist act, while the killing of
gangster Neville Herold and the Planet Hollywood bombing are not terrorist acts. It
appears that the police have sought to name the actions of vigilante groups, gangs and
Islamic fundamentalists by the term urban terrorism.
Martin van Creveld predicts that future wars to be civil wars, with groups not
governments fighting for power. The state will die out, as it can not fight
organizations that are similar to it self. The state will gradually loose its monopoly
over force and will be replaced by private mercenaries, warlords, and commercial
organizations. Groups that we refer to as terrorists, guerilla bandits and robbers will
wage the future war. The leaders of such small groups are charismatic and do not
make distinctions between themselves and the organizations that they lead. These
leaders will wage the future war. The distinction between soldiers and civilians are
already breaking down and those who where in the past not marked as legitimate
targets are now the targets. Religious institutions were in the past not the target of
violence now they are. These targets represent symbolic significance and not
institutional significance. Low intensity conflict does not distinguish between private
and public property and the distinction between crime and war will break down.l'"
161 Van ereveld, The transformation of War, pp. 224 - 227.
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This is an apt description the situation emerging in the Western Cape and the possible
future situation if the state does not act immediately. The state needs to reassert itself
over society and claim back its authority and sovereignty, but for the weak state this is
a difficult task. The assertion of state power is a policy issue and governments must
make 'good' policy choices if it is to survive the twenty-first Century.
The first such policy decision the South African government needs to make is to adopt
a definition of terrorism. This definition must be as far as possible, non-biased and
descriptive without being too vague to be misused. This is the start to the
development to an anti-terrorist policy which should be drafted to include provisions
for identification of terrorist groups, provisions for arrest and detention of suspected
terrorists by security forces and the police and minimum and maximum sentences for
those found guilty of terrorism.
The second policy decision the government needs to make concerns vigilante groups.
Should the state encourage the participation of civilians in the arrest and sentencing of
criminals outside the legal system it stands to loose more authority and the loss of
control over society. Total anarchy will result from such an approach. The only other
alternative is to strengthen the police and justice system. This will require the
revision of old legislation and the drafting of new legislation that is enforceable.
Paramount to this is the need to make to the police and justice system more
representative in terms of race and gender, training of police, judges, and magistrates
and the strengthening of the institutional structures of the judiciary.
Thirdly, the government needs to address the causes of violence, conflict, and crime.
This is a long-term task, which requires economic growth, the creation of employment
and the empowerment of the people through participation in decision making at all
levels of government and in the communities. The government is aware of these
needs and has embarked on projects and programs to meet these objectives.
Ironically, crime, violence, and conflict undermine these attempts and are threatening
to end the progress already made to address these needs.
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Fourthly, the government needs to reestablish itself in society and the government
needs to reinvent itself. State agencies need to be present in communities in the form
of effective local government and service delivery agencies. This is especially needed
with regards to the provision of services related to policing and the justice system.
These would include manned police stations with the necessary resources to perform
tasks and the establishment of magistrates courts in areas they where previously not
found. This is not to say that this will be an easy task but the government has no
alternative.
The present government is prevented from effectively acting against violence,
conflict, and crime by its own past and past actions of the Nationalist Government. It
is necessary to acknowledge that the problems that the government faces concerning
especially policing and justice are entrenched in past events and the previous
government. The government's past is itself however preventing necessary action.
Its failure to effectively deal with PAGAD has brought this problem to the forefront.
The ANC used similar tactics to that used by PAGAD, based on community action to
render the Apartheid State ungovernable. The government's rise to power was based
on 'peoples power', which broke the rule of law to gain leverage over the apartheid
government.
These policy measures will contribute in preventing violence, conflict, and crime from
blocking South Africa's path to building a stable democracy.
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